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First-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have mostly been modelled in auction the-
ory using the decision-theoretic and Bayesian game-theoretic approaches. From
a practical point of view, each approach has its limitations. To overcome those
limitations, Ríos Insua et al. (2009) introduced an approach, called adversarial
risk analysis (ARA) that provides an optimal solution for one of the intervening
agents, based on a decision making problem in hand and treating the intelligent
adversaries’ decisions as uncertainties. ARA solutions for FPSB auctions have
previously been found but only under strong assumptions which make the model
somewhat unrealistic.
In this thesis, we use ARA methodology and model bidders’ behaviours in FPSB
auctions using more realistic assumptions. First, we model bidders’ behaviours by
defining a new utility function that considers bidders’ wealth which is assumed to
be different for each bidder. We consider bidders’ wealth since it is a significant
determinant of their bidding behaviour in these auctions. Also, we define new risk
behaviour parameters that change with the relative change in circumstances of
bidders’ wealth. In our modelling, we assume that the auctioned item is normal
and has a reserve price which is known in advance to each bidder. We find ARA
solutions not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse as well as risk-seeking
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bidders. We model these auctions by ARA framework using non-strategic play,
level-k thinking, mirror equilibrium (ME) and Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) so-
lution concepts. Finding ARA solutions using non-strategic play and level-k think-
ing, ME and BNE (asymmetric case) solution concepts, we assume two bidders.
Whereas, we assume n bidders while finding ARA solutions using BNE symmetric
case.
Second, we use ARA methodology and model bidders’ behaviours using the utility
function that takes into account bidders’ winning and losing regret for the auc-
tioned item. We define new winning and losing regret parameters and a modified
utility function in order to take into account the effect of bidders’ wealth on their
bidding behaviours. Using the modified utility function, we find ARA solutions
using non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution concepts assuming n bidders
participating in these auctions.
We give numerical examples to illustrate our methodology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An auction is a sale in which goods (items), property or services are sold to the
highest bidder. Most of auction theory revolves around the four basic auction
types that are used for the sale of a single item:
1. First-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions in which bidders place their bids in
sealed envelopes and hand over them to the auctioneer. The envelopes are
opened and the individual with the highest bid wins and pays the amount
equal to the bid.
2. Second-price sealed-bid (SPSB) auctions (Vickrey auctions) in which bidders
place their bids in sealed envelopes and hand over them to the auctioneer.
The envelopes are opened and the individual with the highest bid wins but
pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.
3. Open ascending-bid auctions (English auctions) in which participants make
increasingly higher bids, each stopping bidding when they are not prepared
to pay more than the current highest bid. This continues until no participant
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is prepared to make a higher bid; the highest bidder wins the auction at the
final amount bid. In the case when the auctioned item has reserve price, it
is only sold if the bidding reaches a reserve price set by the auctioneer.
4. Open descending-bid auctions (Dutch auctions) in which the price is set by
the auctioneer at a level sufficiently high to deter all bidders, and is progres-
sively lowered until a bidder is prepared to buy at the current price, winning
the auction.
Many other types of auctions also exist in which one or more than one items
are sold such as sequential auctions, multi-unit auctions, combinatorial auctions,
general mth-price sealed-bid auctions, random mth-price sealed-bid auctions and
all-pay auctions etc. For example, a sequential auction is an auction in which
several items are sold, one after the other, to the same group of potential buyers.
However, in this thesis, we consider only FPSB auctions and find solutions from
one of the bidders’ (the decision maker) view point.
1.1 Motivation
FPSB auctions have extensively been analysed using decision-theoretic and Bayesian
game-theoretic approaches in the literature. However, both of these approaches
have certain limitations that make these approaches unrealistic in practical com-
petitive situations. Also, there has been considerable debate over the relative
merits and demerits of these two approaches to model the real life competitive sit-
uations. This debate includes Kadane and Larkey (1982a,b) in favour of decision
theory and Harsanyi (1982a,b) in favour of Bayesian game theory. For more com-
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ments on this debate, see, e.g., Rothkopf (1983); Roth and Schoumaker (1983) and
Kahan (1983). Myerson (1991) also made a concise criticism on decision theory.
Ríos Insua et al. (2009) developed an approach called adversarial risk analysis
(ARA) that has advantages over both the decision-theoretic and Bayesian game-
theoretic approaches and has been applied in many real life competitive situations.
Banks et al. (2015) used ARA for FPSB auctions assuming only risk-neutral bid-
ders and found solutions using non-strategic play, minimax perspective, Bayes
Nash Equilibrium (BNE), level-k thinking and mirror equilibrium (ME) solution
concepts. However, they did not consider bidders’ wealth in their modelling. Also,
they did not consider that the auctioned item has a reserve price which is typically
what occurs in FPSB auctions. In practice, bidders’ wealth and reserve price of
the auctioned item, both play a significant role in determining the decision maker’s
optimal bid. Also, it has been observed in many experiments performed under a
variety of environments by different researchers that bidders in FPSB auctions bid
more aggressively than the risk-neutral types. Therefore, it is important to model
bidders’ overbidding behaviours in these auctions while using an ARA framework.
This has not been done previously.
1.2 Contributions in this Thesis
The main contributions contained in this thesis are as follows:
We consider a reserve price for the auctioned item (typically, known to each bidder
in advance); we take into account bidders’ wealth that is assumed to be different for
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each bidder; we assume that the auctioned item is normal1. Within this scenario,
we
1. Extend Banks et al. (2015) by developing ARA solutions for non-strategic
play and level-k thinking solution concepts assuming two bidders for a real-
istic case, wherein,
a) we find solutions not only when the bidders are assumed to be risk-
neutral but also when they are assumed to be risk-averse and risk-
seeking bidders,
b) we define a new utility function for the bidders,
c) we define a new CRRA parameter to incorporate the effect of increase
in wealth on the bidders’ risk behaviours.
2. Extend Banks et al. (2015) and (Ejaz et al., 2021, or Chapter 3) by developing
ARA solutions for ME and BNE (symmetric and asymmetric case) solution
concepts, wherein,
a) we find solutions not only for risk-neutral bidders but also for risk-averse
and risk-seeking bidders,
b) we extend Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and find numerical solutions
using the shooting algorithm for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders.
1An item with positive income elasticity is defined as a normal item in economic theory, i.e.,
the demand for a normal item rises with an increase in income and falls with a decrease in income
(see, e.g., Fisher, 1990; Goeree et al., 2002; Piros and Pinto, 2013; Perloff, 2015; Baisa, 2017, for
more details).
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3. Find ARA solutions using a utility function that incorporates bidders’ win-
ning and losing regret using non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution
concepts assuming n bidders, wherein,
a) we modify the utility function used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007),
b) we define new winning and losing regret parameters to incorporate the
effect of increase in wealth on bidders’ bidding behaviours.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly provide
some literature on modelling FPSB auctions and bidders’ bidding behaviours in
these auctions. Chapter 2 also explains how an ARA approach works and the
computational issues in finding the decision maker’s optimal bids using certain
solution concepts. In Chapter 3, we propose our new utility function and the
new CRRA parameters. We assume two bidders, Brenda and Charles in Chapter
3 and derive the ARA solutions from Brenda’s perspective using non-strategic
play and level-k thinking solution concepts. In Chapter 4, we find ARA solutions
from Brenda’s perspective using BNE solution concept assuming n bidders and
ME solution concept assuming two bidders. In Chapter 5, we assume n bidders
and find ARA solutions using a risk-neutral utility function that incorporates
bidders’ winning and losing regret. Chapter 5 contains ARA solutions using non-
strategic play and level-k thinking solution concepts. In Chapter 6, we provide the
conclusion of our research work and some further work that could be done.
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Chapter 2
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions and
Adversarial Risk Analysis
In this Chapter, we briefly provide some literature review on the approaches used
to model first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions and bidders’ bidding behaviours in
these auctions. This Chapter also explains how an adversarial risk analysis (ARA)
approach works and discusses the computational issues while finding the solutions.
2.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
2.1.1 Frameworks to Model FPSB Auctions
The Bayesian game-theoretic and decision-theoretic frameworks have widely been
applied to model FPSB auctions in the literature. The latter framework considers
the decision making problem from the decision maker’s point of view where she
wants to maximise her expected utility and believes that she is bidding against
non-strategic bidders (playing against Nature) who might bid according to their
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true values for the item only. Friedman (1956) presented the first academic pa-
per using a decision-theoretic approach on FPSB auctions. Further work using a
decision-theoretic approach for auctions includes, competitive bidding in high risk
situations (Capen et al., 1971), allocating bidding capital (Keefer et al., 1991),
modelling competitive bidding (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994), the right tool for
auctions (Rothkopf, 2007), behavioural models for FPSB auctions (Wang and Guo,
2017) among others. In practice, bidders use decision-theoretic models rather than
the game-theoretic models for auctions (Rothkopf, 2007).
In contrast, a Bayesian game-theoretic model assumes that each bidder strategi-
cally draws the value for the auctioned item from the same (symmetric auctions)
or different (asymmetric auctions) but known distribution(s) to all bidders and all
bidders seek a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) bidding strategy. Vickrey (1961)
assumed risk-neutral (indifferent to risk when making a decision) bidders who draw
their values independently and privately from a uniform distribution and found a
bidding strategy using a Bayesian game-theoretic approach. That bidding strategy
in auction theory is known as a risk-neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) bidding




vi, i = 1 . . . , n,
where n is the number of bidders and vi is the ith bidder’s true value. Vickery’s
(1961) paper is considered to be a significant breakthrough in auction theory. Fur-
ther work for auctions using a Bayesian game-theoretic model includes, study of
bidding with unknown casts (Criesmer et al., 1967), competitive bidding with dis-
parate information (Wilson, 1969), optimal auctions (Riley and Samuelson, 1981),
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theory and behaviour of single object auctions (Cox et al., 1982a), auction theory
of heterogeneous bidders (Cox et al., 1982b), optimal auctions with risk-averse
buyers (Maskin and Riley, 1984), asymmetric auctions (Maskin and Riley, 2000),
semiparametric estimation of FPSB auctions (Campo et al., 2011), existence of
monotone equilibrium in FPSB auctions (Gentry et al., 2015), hidden reserve price
with risk-averse bidders (Li and Tan, 2017) among others.
However, in practice, bidders draw their valuations for the auctioned item from
their own distributions which are not commonly known to all bidders and also the
other bidders may be strategic. Therefore, the “common knowledge” and “non-
strategic opponents” assumptions in Bayesian game theory and decision theory,
respectively, make these two approaches unrealistic in real life competitive situa-
tions.
2.1.2 Modelling Bidding Behaviour in FPSB Auctions
Bidding behaviours in FPSB auctions have extensively been studied using ex-
perimental techniques. In these experiments, a consistent outcome found is that
the bidders consistently bid above the RNNE bidding strategy (see e.g., Dorsey
and Razzolini, 2003; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok,
2007, among others). The reasons for this overbidding remain an unsolved puzzle
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2007). Several explanations have been given in
economic literature to describe the overbidding behaviours of the bidders in these
auctions. These explanations can generally be classified into four main categories:
risk-aversion, interpersonal interaction, learning direction, and regret.
Risk-averse bidders are bidders who bid more aggressively than risk-neutral bid-
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ders. They have an aversion to losing the auctioned item to another bidder. There-
fore, the bidders’ overbidding behaviours have been explained by assuming that the
bidders have a risk-averse utility function. A constant relative risk-averse (CRRA)
utility function is the most commonly used function to explain this overbidding
behaviour (Holt and Laury, 2002). A basic CRRA utility function for the ith
bidder having wealth wi is defined as
ui(wi) = w
ri
i , wi > 0, (2.1)
where, (1 − ri) = −wiu′′i (wi)/u′i(wi) is the coefficient of CRRA or Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk-aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965). The utility function
(2.1) is the utility function for a risk-neutral bidder when ri = 1, it is the utility
function for a risk-averse bidder when 0 < ri < 1 and it is the utility function for
a risk-seeking bidder when ri > 1, where risk-seeking bidders bid less aggressively
than those of risk-neutral bidders (Holt and Laury, 2002). In principle, ri can take
any value greater than 1 i.e., ri > 1 for risk-seeking. However, it has been argued
that, in practice, ri does not take values greater than 2 (Holt and Laury, 2002).
Therefore, in this thesis, we consider 1 < ri ≤ 2 when the ith bidder is assumed
to be risk-seeking.
Lu and Perrigne (2008); Gentry et al. (2015); Li and Tan (2017) among others
used (2.1) and defined the ith bidder’s utility function having wealth wi as
ui(bi, vi, wi) =

(wi + vi − bi)ri , if she wins the bid,
wrii , if she loses the bid,
(2.2)
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where, vi is the ith bidder’s true value for the auctioned item and bi is her amount
of bid. Cox et al. (1982a, 1985); Maréchal and Morand (2011), among others, also




(vi − bi)ri , if she wins the bid,
0, if she loses the bid.
(2.3)
Note that (2.3) is the special case of (2.2) when wi = 0. However, it has been
shown that the utility function (2.2) is unrealistic because it will yield a positive
utility even when bi > wi (as long as wi+vi ≥ bi) in which case the bidder does not
have the ability to buy the auctioned item (see, Ejaz et al., 2021a, or Chapter 3
for more details). Using (2.3), the expected utility of the ith bidder can be defined
as
Ψi = (vi − bi)riFij(bi), (2.4)
where, Fij is the ith bidder’s subjective distribution on the jth bidder’s bid and the
jth bidder is assumed to the bidder who has the maximum bid among the other
(n − 1) bidders. The optimal bid b∗i for the ith bidder using a decision-theoretic
approach may be found by finding the turning point of Ψi in (2.4). We have
dΨi
dbi

















where fij is the pdf of bi. Equating the above equation to zero, we get
(vi − bi)fij(bi)− riFij(bi) = 0. (2.5)
The above equation may need numerical methods to solve it for bi.
Isaac and Walker (1985); Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002); Morgan et al. (2003)
among others gave another explanation that bidders bid over RNNE bidding strat-
egy due to inter-personal interactions and comparisons in FPSB auctions.
Neugebauer and Selten (2006) found that most of the bidders adjust their bids in
the same way as that of learning direction theory proposed by Selten and Stoecker
(1986). This theory leads to the direction in which the bids are likely to be ad-
justed based on the feedback over time. However, this theory does not give any
explanation of bidders’ initial overbidding.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) provided another possible explanation of overbidding
in these auctions and defined bidders’ utilities by a linear combination of their
profit, winning and losing regrets. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) also
modelled the ith bidder’s bidding behaviour by taking into account her winning
and losing regrets while assuming that she has a risk-neutral utility. They defined






[ζi + ηi(bi − bj)]fij(bj|bj ≤ bi)dbj, if she wins,
−
∫
bj :bi<bj≤vi [ϑi + θi(vi − bj)]fij(bj|bj > bi)dbj, if she loses,
(2.6)
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where bj is the jth bidder’s bid and is the maximum of the other (n− 1) bidders’
bid and fij(bj) is the probability distribution on bj that the ith bidder believes. In
(2.6), bi − bj is the excess amount of money if the ith bidder wins and her utility
suffers by an amount ζi + ηi(bi − bj) where ηi ≥ 0. Larger values of ηi means a
higher winning regret to the ith bidder. Negative values of ζi allows some pleasure
to the ith bidder in case of winning. On the other hand, if the ith bidder loses
and the highest bid satisfies the inequality bi ≤ bj ≤ vi, then the ith bidder misses
an opportunity to win at a favourable price and her utility suffers by an amount
ϑi + θi(vi − bj) where ϑi, θi ≥ 0. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) defined












[ϑi + θi(vi − bj)]fij(bj|bj > bi)dbj
]
[1− Fij(bi)].
As, fij(bj|bj ≤ bi) = fij(bj)/Fij(bi) and fij(bj|bj > bi) = fij(bj)/[1 − Fij(bi)], the
above equation simplifies to
Ψi = (vi − bi)Fij(bi)−
∫
bj :vj<bj≤bi




[ϑi + θi(vi − bj)]fij(bj)dbj.
(2.7)
Now, the optimal bid b∗i for the ith bidder may be found by finding the turning




=(vi − bi)fij(bi)− Fij(bi)−
[














[ϑi + θi(vi − vi)]fij(vi)
d
dbi















(−ζi + ϑi) + (1 + θi)(vi − bi)
]
fij(bi)− (1 + ηi)Fij(bi).
Now, dividing both sides of the above equation by 1 + θi and substituting ϕi =
(−ζi + ϑi)/(1 + θi) and ρi = (1 + ηi)/(1 + θi) gives
dΨi
dbi
/(1 + θi) =
[
ϕi + (vi − bi)
]
fij(bi)− ρiFij(bi).
Equating the above equation to zero, gives us the first order condition
[
ϕi + (vi − bi)
]
fij(bi)− ρiFij(bi) = 0. (2.8)
Now, if −ζi + ϑi = 0 (i.e., ϕi = 0), then (2.8) would be exactly the same as that
of (2.5), the first order condition for a CRRA bidder with risk aversion parameter
ri = ρi, which leads to the following observations:
• If ηi = θi, i.e., ri = ρi = 1, then b∗ would be the optimum bid of a risk-neutral
bidder.
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• If ηi < θi, i.e., 0 < ri = ρi < 1, then b∗ would be the optimum bid of a
risk-averse bidder. The level of risk-aversion would increase as ρi → 0.
• If θi < ηi ≤ 1 + 2θi, i.e., 1 < ri = ρi ≤ 2, then b∗ would be the optimum bid
of a risk-seeking bidder. The level of risk-seeking behaviour would increase
as ρi → 2.
However, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) in (2.6) did not take into
account the ith bidder’s wealth and therefore assumed wi = 0. Whereas, using
(2.6), the ith bidder can find her optimal bid b∗i > 0, which is greater than her
assumed wealth wi = 0. This is unrealistic because, in practice, b∗i ≤ wi. There-
fore, considering bidders’ wealth is a significant determinant of bidders’ bidding
behaviour in these auctions (see e.g., Gentry et al., 2015; Ejaz et al., 2021a, among
others). Moreover, assuming that the ith bidder have wealth wi such that wi ≥ b∗i
is a realistic assumption to be made. Also, using such type of utility function,
FPSB auctions have not been modelled by an ARA framework previously.
2.2 Adversarial Risk Analysis
To overcome the limitations of the Bayesian game-theoretic and decision-theoretic
approaches that we have discussed in the previous section, Ríos Insua et al. (2009)
introduced an approach called adversarial risk analysis (ARA). This approach
models competitive decision-making problems such as war, politics, cyber-security,
counter-terrorism, auctions etc., from one of the players’ (the decision maker) point
of view only in the presence of intelligent adversaries. Using an ARA framework,
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the decision maker may believe that her adversaries are strategic and finds her
optimal action by placing her subjective distributions to take into account the
unknown preferences, beliefs and utilities of her intelligent adversaries. Unlike
Bayesian game theory, ARA does not assume that these subjective distributions
are commonly known to each player. Since, in ARA, the decision maker uses
her subjective distributions to model the uncertainties around her adversaries’
beliefs and preferences etc., it is a Bayesian approach. Including auctions, this
approach has been applied to model a variety of real life competitive situations
such as network routing for insurgency (Wang and Banks, 2011), counter-terrorism
risk management (Merrick and Parnell, 2011), Borel games (Banks et al., 2011),
the Somali pirates case (Sevillano et al., 2012), counter-terrorism modelling (Rios
and Ríos Insua, 2012), autonomous social agents (Esteban and Ríos Insua, 2014),
pricing strategies with remanufacturing (Deng and Ma, 2015), urban security re-
source allocation (Gil et al., 2016), adversarial classification (Naveiro et al., 2019),
counter-terrorist online surveillance (Gil and Parra-Arnau, 2019), cyber-security
(Rios Insua et al., 2021), insider threat (Joshi et al., 2020) and FPSB auctions
(Banks et al., 2015), (Ejaz et al., 2021a,b, or Chapter 3,4 respectivley) among
others.
In particular, ARA addresses three different kinds of uncertainties:
1. Aleatory uncertainty, which is about the randomness of outcomes conditional
on the actions taken by all the opponents of the decision maker including
herself. However, for auctions, aleatory uncertainty arises when the decision
maker does not have a full knowledge about the condition of the auctioned
item. Therefore, she could have an uncertainty on her own true value. In
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that case, her true value would be a random variable that could follow a
certain distribution elicited by the decision maker.
2. Epistemic uncertainty, which is about the strategic choices of intelligent ad-
versaries, that may include unknown preferences, beliefs, and capabilities of
each of the opponents. For auctions, epistemic uncertainty arises when the
decision maker is uncertain about her opponents’ private values, wealth, risk
behaviour parameters or regret parameters etc.
3. Concept uncertainty, which is about the decision maker’s belief how her ad-
versaries frame the decision making problem. It is about the assessment of
solution concept (non-strategic play, level-k thinking, BNE or mirror equi-
librium (ME) etc.) that each of her adversaries will use. For auctions, the
concept uncertainty is the same as that for other real life applications, i.e.,
it is about the solution concept.
A brief description of some common solution concepts is as follows:
• Non-strategic play, in which the decision maker believes that her adversaries’
actions are independent of their opponents’ actions (including the decision
maker’s action). For auctions, when the decision maker believes that her
adversaries’ bids are independent of their opponents’ bids (including the
decision maker’s bid), she finds her optimal bid using this solution concept.
• Level-k thinking, when the decision maker believes that her adversaries are
intelligent who might make their decisions by taking into account their oppo-
nents’ preferences, utilities and beliefs. Then she could use a level-k thinking
solution concept to find her optimal decision for a decision making problem
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in hand. In a level-k thinking solution concept, the decision maker being
a level-k thinker believes that her adversaries are level-(k − 1) thinkers and
each level-(k − 1) thinker believes that her/his adversaries are level-(k − 2)
thinkers and so on. For instance, when k = 1, she believes that her opponent
is a level-0 thinker, that is, a non-strategic player. A level-2 analysis means
that the decision maker assumes that her opponent is a level-1 thinker, who
believes that she is a level-0 thinker. A level-3 analysis means that the de-
cision maker assumes that her opponent is a level-2 thinker who models her
as a level-1 thinker and so on. Thus, the decision maker always thinks one
level higher than her rivals in this solution concept.
• Bayes Nash Equilibrium, in which the decision maker believes that her adver-
saries are assuming that there is a great deal of common knowledge among
all the participants of the decision making problem.
• Mirror Equilibrium, when the decision maker believes that her adversaries
are modelling their opponents’ (including the decision maker) actions in the
same way as she is modelling their actions, then she could use a mirror equi-
librium (ME) solution concept. In this solution concept, all players use their
subjective distributions over the probabilities and utilities of their adversaries
and seek an equilibrium.
A detailed explanation about non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution con-
cepts is provided in Chapter 3 and those of BNE and ME in Chapter 4.
In order to solve a given decision making problem by an ARA approach, each of
aleatory, epistemic and concept uncertainty needs to be modelled. At the first step,
the decision maker has to handle the concept uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty
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is dealt in the second step and aleatory uncertainty is considered to be modelled
in the end. Each step bears its own challenges.
Now, we illustrate the ARA methodology by considering a two player game
from one of the players’ point of view named Brenda (B) who is playing against her
opponent named Charles (C). Let b be the Brenda’s choice that she makes from a
set of choices B. She believes that c is Charles’s choice that he could make from his
set of choices C. From the choices, b and c, let S be the resulting random outcome
that takes a value s from a set of possible outcomes S. Let uB(b, c, s) and uC(b, c, s)
be the utilities received by Brenda and Charles respectively, given the choices b, c
and outcome s. A typical objective could be to find Brenda’s optimal choice b∗ that
maximises her expected utility. This game is represented in the form of a bi-agent
influence diagram (BAID) in Figure 2.1. In this diagram, the decision, chance
and utility nodes are represented by rectangles, circles and hexagons, respectively.
Figure 2.1a represents this game from both Brenda and Charles’s perspective while
Figure 2.1b represents this game from Brenda’s perspective only where, she is
uncertain about Charles’s decision and thus his decision node is represented by a
chance node.
Using an ARA approach, Brenda has to integrate out her concept, epistemic
and aleatory uncertainties at the chance nodes and then to maximise her expected
utility at the decision node. Typically, Brenda does not know about which solu-
tion concept Charles will use. But, she can place her subjective distribution over
possible solution concepts that Charles will use based upon her past experience
with Charles or some information from other sources. She can solve the decision
making problem using each solution concept and can find her optimal decision









(b) The BAID from Brenda’s point of view (ARA perspective).
Figure 2.1: The BAID for a two players’ game.
maximises her expected utility using the weighted mixture of her optimal decisions
found against each solution concept. Suppose that Brenda believes that Charles
is an expected utility maximiser and therefore finds her optimal decision for the
given game as follows.
She takes into account her uncertainty around c by placing her subjective distri-
bution pB(c) and finds her expected utility as
ΨB(b) =
∫
ΨB(b, c)pB(c) dc, (2.9)
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where ΨB(b, c) is Brenda’s expected utility while taking into account her uncer-
tainty about the random outcome S given b and c and is defined as
ΨB(b, c) =
∫
uB(b, c, s)pB(s|b, c) ds,
and pB(s|b, c) is Brenda’s subjective distribution that takes into account her aleatory
uncertainty around the chance outcome S given b and c. Then, she finds her op-
timal decision b∗ that maximises her expected utility in (2.9) as
b∗ = arg max
b∈B
ΨB(b).
The major challenge using an ARA approach is to deal with the epistemic un-
certainty, i.e., the uncertainty around pB(c). This uncertainty depends upon the
solution concept that Brenda believes that Charles might use. In general, the
epistemic uncertainties are complex to describe, even for simple solution concepts.
In this illustration, we assume that Brenda believes that Charles might choose his
action c∗ that maximises his expected utility, just like her. Therefore, she may
aim to find c∗, if she knows about Charles’s utility uC(b, c, s), his probabilities
pC(b) and pC(s|b, c). However, typically she does not know about these quantities
and can model her uncertainty about Charles’s utility through eliciting a random
utility UC(b, c, s) and those of her uncertainties about his probabilities through
random probabilities PC(b) and PC(s|b, c). Then, she can find Charles’s random
optimal choice C∗ by using a backward induction approach similar to her own, i.e.,
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first she will find Charles’s random expected utility as
ΨC(c) =
∫
ΨC(b, c)PC(b) db (2.10)
=
∫ [∫
UC(b, c, s)PC(s|b, c) ds
]
PC(b) db.
Then, she will find Charles’s random optimal choice C∗ that maximises his random
expected utility in (2.10) as
C∗ = arg max
c∈C
ΨC(c).





In the above illustration, we have assumed that sets B, C and S are sets that
contain infinitely many points. If any of these sets is assumed to be of finite
cardinality, then the corresponding integrals would be replaced by sums. This is
how Brenda can find her optimal choice when she believes that her opponent is an
expected utility maximiser.
2.3 Computational Issues
In this section, we describe computational challenges that arise using the Bayesian
game theory, decision theory and the ARA approaches.
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2.3.1 Bayesian Game Theory
To illustrate the computational challenges while finding a BNE solution, suppose
that the bidders use the CRRA utility function (2.3). Then the BNE bid functions
bi(vi), i = 1, . . . , n for the asymmetric case (valuation distributions are assumed to
be different for each bidder) could be found by maximizing each expected utility
function with respect to its argument bi. This yields the following system of















, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (2.11)
where gi[vi(b)] is the probability density function (pdf) of the inverse bid function
vi(b). Let b̄ be the common highest possible bid and b be the common lowest
possible bid. Also, suppose that v and v̄ are the common lower and upper support
of Gi[vi(b)] respectively. Then, as vi(b) = b(v) = v, the following are the boundary
conditions on the equilibrium inverse bid functions:
vi(b) = v (or equivalently vi(v) = v), Left boundary condition,
vi(b̄) = v̄, Right boundary condition,
(2.12)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. The solution to the system of ODEs (2.11) is needed which
satisfies both of the boundary conditions on the inverse bid functions. In gen-
eral, no closed-form solution of (2.11) exists and numerical methods are thus re-
quired. Marshall et al. (1994) found numerical solutions for asymmetric auctions
by adopting the shooting algorithm assuming risk-neutral bidders which could be
used to find a numerical solution for (2.11). Further work on numerical meth-
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ods includes, comparing competition and collusion (Bajari, 2001), perturbation
approach (Fibich and Gavious, 2003), asymmetric first-price auctions (Gayle and
Richard, 2008), investigating bid preferences (Hubbard and Paarsch, 2009), asym-
metric first-price auctions (Fibich and Gavish, 2011), equilibria in auction models
with asymmetries (Hubbard and Paarsch, 2014) among others.
However, these works did not include numerical solutions when the bidders are
risk-averse or risk-seeking. Moreover, the utility function (2.3) does not take into
account bidders’ wealth and also has other limitations (see Ejaz et al., 2021a, or
Chapter 3). Further, Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and others found the BNE so-
lution under the common prior assumption, i.e., each bidder knows the valuation
distributions of the other bidders and that this is common knowledge, which is
also unrealistic.
2.3.2 Decision Theory
Finding the solutions using a decision-theoretic approach, the decision maker do
not need to find any kind of equilibrium solution like BNE or ME, yet she may
need to find solutions numerically, as in general, no close form solutions exist for
these solution concepts also. For example, using a decision-theoretic approach,
the decision maker can obtain (2.5) but this equation, in general, needs numerical
solutions to solve for bi. She can find solutions by using any of numerical methods
such as bisection method, Newton’s method or fixed-point iteration method etc.
(see e.g., McNamee and Pan, 2013).
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2.3.3 ARA
Using the BNE (asymmetric case) solution concept, the ARA approach assumes
that the distributions Gi[vi(b)] on the inverse bid functions are not commonly
known to each bidder (unlike Bayesian game theory). Even under this assump-
tion, the decision maker essentially needs to solve (2.11) and have to face the same
computational challenges as using Bayesian game theory. However, using the ARA
approach, the decision maker eventually finds the distribution of her competitive
bid after solving (2.11). Then she uses her own value and risk aversion parameter
and finds the her optimal bid or expected optimal bid that maximises her expected
utility.
Also, in general, no close form solution exists while finding ARA solutions using a
ME solution concept because this solution concept seeks an equilibrium (equilibria
in case of more than two bidders) too and numerical methods as described earlier
in this section are thus required. For two bidders, the key calculations are same
for both BNE asymmetric case and ME solution concepts but the assumptions
and perspective are different (see e.g., Wang and Banks, 2011). However, using
the ME solution concept in case of n > 2 bidders, the decision maker needs to
find a numerical equilibrium solution by placing subjective distributions over the
unknown quantities of the other (n− 1) bidders from each of her opponents’ point
of view. Thus, for each opponent, she needs to find (n− 1) numerical equilibrium
solutions. Then she finds each of her opponents’ belief about the distribution of
each of his/her rivals’ bids and finds their optimal bids. Then the decision maker
finds the distribution of the maximum of her (n− 1) opponents’ bid. Finally, she
uses her own true value and risk behaviour parameter and finds her optimal bid
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that maximises her expected utility.
Also, finding ARA solutions using a non-strategic play or level-k thinking solu-
tion concepts, the decision maker has to bear essentially similar computational
challenges as that of finding solutions using a decision-theoretic approach. For
example, finding ARA solutions using a level-k thinking solution concept for a
CRRA utility function of the form (2.3), the decision maker has to solve the simi-
lar equations such as (2.5) at level (k−1) from each of her adversaries’ perspective
to find their optimal bids by taking into account the uncertainties such as their
valuations and risk parameters. Then she finds the distribution of the maximum
bid among other (n−1) bidders from her level-(k−1) analysis. Finally, she uses her
own value and risk aversion and solves a computationally similar equation as (2.5)
to find her optimal bid that maximises her expected utility. However, finding the
ARA solutions for non-strategic play or level-k thinking solution concepts using
a utility function (2.6) with bidders’ regret are computationally more challenging
than finding these solutions using a CRRA utility function (2.3).
In this thesis, we also consider the effect of bidders’ wealth on their bidding be-
haviour by defining a new utility function. Therefore, the decision maker needs
to take into account the uncertainties around her adversaries’ wealth too in ad-
dition to their values and risk behaviours while using a certain solution concept
(non-strategic play, level-k thinking, BNE or ME etc). Then, she uses her own
true value, wealth and risk behaviour parameter and finds her optimal bid that
maximises her expected utility. Also, we consider the effect of bidders’ wealth
on their bidding behaviour by defining a utility function that takes into account
bidders’ winning and losing regrets. Thus, the decision maker also needs to place
her subjective distributions on her adversaries’ wealth in addition to their values
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and regret parameters while using such type of utility function. Finally, she uses
her own true value, wealth and regret parameters and finds her optimal bid that
maximises her expected utility.
Moreover, as ARA takes into account the uncertainties such as bidders’ valua-
tions, wealth, risk behaviours parameters or regret parameters etc., Monte Carlo
methods may be used to find solutions using a given solution concept.
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Chapter 3
Adversarial Risk Analysis for
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
In this chapter, we use ARA methodology to model FPSB auctions using more
realistic assumptions. We define a new utility function that considers bidders’
wealth, we assume a reserve price and find solutions not only for risk-neutral but
also for risk-averse as well as risk-seeking bidders. We model the problem using
ARA for non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution concepts.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Decision vs Game-Theoretic Approaches
The first modern academic paper on first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions was
presented by Friedman (1956) and used a decision-theoretic approach. Further
work using decision-theoretic models followed. Capen et al. (1971); Keefer et al.
(1991) and Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) concluded that in practice, bidders use
36
decision-theoretic models to decide upon their bids. Rothkopf (2007) and Wang
and Guo (2017) provided several arguments as to why decision theory dominates
game theory. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) also used a decision-theoretic
model for FPSB auctions assuming risk-neutral bidders while taking into account
bidders’ winning and losing regret.
In contrast, a large number of Bayesian game-theoretic approaches have been
proposed for FPSB auctions as well. Vickrey (1961) analysed n bidders in FPSB
auctions using Bayesian game theory with the values drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution with common support. This work was further extended by Criesmer
et al. (1967) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). Wilson (1969) developed the first
closed form equilibrium analysis with the common value model where, the value
of the auctioned item is the same for all bidders. Cox et al. (1982a) and Cox et al.
(1982b) generalised Vickrey’s model to the case of risk-averse bidders. Maskin and
Riley (2000) analysed FPSB auctions assuming the valuations of each bidder are
drawn from commonly known different distributions. Myerson (1981); Milgrom
and Weber (1982); Goeree et al. (2002); Bajari and Hortacsu (2005); Campo et al.
(2011); Gentry et al. (2015); Li and Tan (2017) among others also used Bayesian
game-theoretic models for auctions.
However, both these approaches have their drawbacks. While a decision-
theoretic approach does not require the common knowledge assumption, it does
assume that the other bidders are non-strategic. Assuming non-strategic bid-
ders may be unrealistic because bidders may often be strategic. In contrast, a
Bayesian game-theoretic model requires a strong common knowledge assumption
that all bidders (who are considered to be strategic) draw their valuations for the
auctioned item from commonly known distributions. The common knowledge as-
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sumption can also be unrealistic because the distribution used by one bidder is
usually not commonly known to others. In fact, often the bidders try to keep their
information secret so as to gain competitive advantage. Also, finding a Bayes Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) becomes increasingly difficult as the games get more realistic
(complex) and often it may be that a unique BNE solution to a given game does
not exist.
3.1.2 Adversarial Risk Analysis
To overcome the shortcomings of both the decision-theoretic and the Bayesian
game-theoretic approaches, Ríos Insua et al. (2009) introduced an approach called
adversarial risk analysis (ARA) to model the decision making problems in the
presence of an intelligent adversary such as those encountered in cyber-security,
counter-terrorism, war, politics, auctions, etc. ARA is a Bayesian approach be-
cause subjective distributions are used to model the uncertainties about the out-
comes and about the unknown preferences, beliefs and capabilities of intelligent
adversaries. However, unlike Bayesian game theory, ARA does not require that
these subjective distributions be commonly known. Another important difference
to Bayesian game theory is that ARA aims to solve the decision making problem
for just one of the players and does not aim to find an equilibrium solution for all
the players. For this reason, finding an ARA solution is relatively less difficult,
even for complex problems.
Since its introduction, it has been used to model a variety of problems such as net-
work routing for insurgency (Wang and Banks, 2011), international piracy (Sevil-
lano et al., 2012), counter-terrorism (Rios and Ríos Insua, 2012), autonomous
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social agents (Esteban and Ríos Insua, 2014), urban security resource allocation
(Gil et al., 2016), adversarial classification (Naveiro et al., 2019), computational
advancements (Ekin et al., 2019), reinforcement learning (Gallego et al., 2019),
counter-terrorist online surveillance (Gil and Parra-Arnau, 2019), cyber-security
(Ríos Insua et al., 2021), autonomous agents (Esteban et al., 2020), insider threat
(Joshi et al., 2020) and military command and control decision making (Caballero
et al., 2021).
We will illustrate how ARA works by considering a two player game between
Brenda (B), and Charles (C). Let b and c be the choices they make from their
respective sets of actions B and C. The resulting outcome S is a chance vari-
able which takes a value s from a set of possible outcomes S. Let uB(b, c, s) and
uC(b, c, s) be the utility functions that determine the utilities received by Brenda
and Charles respectively, given a pair of actions (b, c) and outcome s. Suppose that
we are solving the problem for Brenda. Then, a typical objective will be to find the
optimal action b∗ that maximises her expected utility. Figure 3.1 represents this
game in the form of a bi-agent influence diagram (BAID), where rectangles, circles
and hexagons represent decision, chance and utility nodes, respectively. Figure
3.1a represents this game from both Brenda and Charles’s point of view while Fig-
ure 3.1b represents this game from Brenda’s point of view only where, Charles’s
decision node is now a chance node for Brenda because she is uncertain about his
actions.
The basic idea behind finding an ARA solution is to integrate out the uncer-
tainties at the chance nodes and then to maximise the expected utility at the
decision nodes. When solving the problem for Brenda, we have two chance nodes,










Figure 3.1: (a) The BAID for simultaneous game. (b) The BAID from Brenda’s
perspective.
induction for Brenda as follows.




uB(b, c, s)pB(s|b, c) ds,
where pB(s|b, c) denotes Brenda’s uncertainty in S given actions b and c. Next,




ΨB(b, c)pB(c) dc, (3.1)
where pB(c) is Brenda’s uncertainty in C. Then, we can find the optimal action
b∗ that maximises her expected utility as
b∗ = arg max
b∈B
ΨB(b).
The main challenge in the above modelling is to determine pB(c). Brenda may
elicit pB(c) either by using her subjective beliefs or by using data on the past
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auction bids by Charles on similar items or by using an expert opinion. But, she
could also choose to elicit pB(c) by modelling Charles’s strategic thinking process.
For example, she may believe that Charles is an expected utility maximiser, just
like her, and would choose the action c∗ that maximises his expected utility. She
can aim to find c∗, if Charles’s utility function uC(b, c, s) and his probabilities
pC(b) and pC(s|b, c) are available to her. However, these quantities are typically
not available to her. She can model her uncertainty about Charles’s utility and his
probabilities through eliciting a random utility UC(b, c, s) and random probabilities
PC(b) and PC(s|b, c). Then, following a backward induction approach similar to
her own, she can find Charles’s random optimal action C∗ as
C∗ = arg max
c∈C
ΨC(c),
where ΨC(c) is his random expected utility. Then, she could find her required




∗ ≤ c). (3.2)
We have assumed that the sets B, C and S are the sets that contain infinitely
many points. If any of these sets were of finite cardinality then the corresponding
integrals would be replaced by sums. Also, we have assumed that Charles is an
expected utility maximiser when assessing pB(c). However, this probability can
be assessed by assuming a number of alternative solution concepts. For example,
Brenda can solve this problem by assuming that Charles is a non-strategic player
or that he is a level-k thinker or that he uses BNE to determine his optimal action
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and so on. An ARA solution can be found for each of these solution concepts
(Banks et al., 2015).
Banks et al. (2015) modelled FPSB auctions assuming that each bidder is risk-
neutral (see below). They derived ARA solutions assuming that the opponent has
different solution concepts such as non-strategic play, minimax perspective, level-k
thinking, mirror equilibrium and BNE. However, they did not consider bidders’
wealth, while defining their utility function. Also, they did not model risk-averse
or risk-seeking behaviour of the bidders. They also did not consider reserve price
for the auctioned item which is a common practice in FPSB auctions. In reality, it
is well known that bidders’ wealth, their risk appetite and whether the item had
a reserve price or not, all play a role in determining the bid the item may attract.
3.1.3 Utility Function
In the context of auctions, risk relates to the risk of not winning the item. A
risk-neutral bidder is defined as the one who is indifferent to risk when making
a bidding decision. A risk-neutral behaviour could be due to a rational decision
making process and a person taking a calculated balanced approach. Risk-averse
bidders are the bidders who do not want to lose the item. Thus, they bid more ag-
gressively than risk-neutral bidders. Whereas, risk-seeking bidders are the bidders
who are keen to get the item at a low price. Thus, they bid less aggressively than
risk-neutral bidders. Previous literature reveals that risk aversion is an important
determinant of bidders’ bidding behaviour in auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982;
Maskin and Riley, 1984; Gentry et al., 2015). Specifically in FPSB auctions, a bid-
der does not really know about other bidders’ behaviours. Therefore, risk aversion
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is relevant to these auctions (Cox et al., 1988; Kagel, 1995; Dorsey and Razzolini,
2003).
A commonly used utility function in the literature of auctions for risk-averse bid-
ders is the constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) utility function and it is so because
of its computational ease (Holt and Laury, 2002). A basic CRRA utility function
for a bidder having wealth w is defined as
u(w) = wr, w > 0, (3.3)
where, (1− r) = −wu′′(w)/u′(w) is the coefficient of CRRA or Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure of relative risk-aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965), which measures the pro-
portion of wealth an individual will choose to hold on a risky asset, for a given
level of wealth w. The utility function (3.3) is strictly convex for 1 < r ≤ 2, which
represents the risk-seeking behaviour, it is linear for r = 1, which represents the
risk-neutral behaviour and it is strictly concave for 0 < r < 1, which represents
the risk-averse behaviour (Holt and Laury, 2002).
Cox et al. (1982a, 1985); Maréchal and Morand (2011), among others, used
(3.3) without considering bidders’ wealth and defined their utility function as
u(b, v) = (v − b)r,
where, v is a bidder’s true value and b is the successful bid. Others, for example, Lu
and Perrigne (2008); Li and Tan (2017) used (3.3) while also considering bidders’
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wealth and defined their utility function in case of their successful bid as
u(b, v, w) = (w + v − b)r, (3.4)
where, they assumed that all bidders have the same wealth w ≥ 0. However, in
Section 3.2 we show that this utility function is unrealistic for multiple reasons.
We propose a new utility function that is more realistic and does not have the
drawbacks that (3.4) has.
Normal good: In Economic theory a good that has positive income elasticity is
defined as a normal good. That is, demand for a normal good rises when income
increases and falls when the income falls (see, e.g. Fisher, 1990; Goeree et al., 2002;
Piros and Pinto, 2013; Perloff, 2015). It is an item for which a person’s demand
increases with increase in her wealth (Baisa, 2017). The items that are typically
considered to be normal include consumables, but also items such as collectibles,
houses, cars, jewellery, etc. Thus, when bidding on a normal item, a bidder could
be more risk-averse (or less risk-seeking) with increase in their wealth. That is,
relative wealth and risk behaviour are linked and it is therefore not enough to model
the risk behaviour by using a CRRA parameter that is not directly linked to the
relative wealth. However, except for Baisa (2017), the type of goods auctioned has
not specifically been taken into account when defining utility functions and CRRA
parameters.
3.1.4 Contributions in this Chapter
The main contributions contained in this chapter are as follows:
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• We extend Banks et al. (2015) by developing ARA solutions for non-strategic
play and level-k thinking solution concepts for a realistic case, wherein,
• we consider a reserve price for the auctioned item (typically, known to
each bidder in advance),
• we take into account bidders’ wealth,
• we find solutions not only for risk-neutral bidders but also for risk-averse
and risk-seeking bidders.
• we assume that the auctioned item is normal and define a new utility function
for the bidders.
• unlike the utility function (3.4), where it is assumed that all bidders have
the same wealth, we assume that the bidders may have different wealths.
• we use the CRRA parameter r and also define a new CRRA parameter a to
incorporate the effect of increase in wealth on the bidders’ risk behaviour.
3.1.5 Structure of the Chapter
In this chapter, we assume that we are finding ARA solutions for Brenda (B)
against her opponent Charles (C) in an FPSB auction. The remainder of the
chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we propose our new utility function
and the new CRRA parameters. In Section 3.3, we derive the ARA solution for
the FPSB game, where Brenda assumes that Charles is a non-strategic player.
In Section 3.4, we derive the solution, where Brenda assumes that Charles is a
level-k thinker. In both Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we also illustrate the ARA solutions
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with detailed numerical examples. Finally, in Section 3.5, we discuss the results
obtained in this chapter and sketch ideas for further work.
3.2 New Utility Function and New CRRA Param-
eters
3.2.1 Drawbacks of Utility Function (3.4)
For the utility function (3.4), the wealth w has been defined in many ways in
the auction literature. For example, w ≥ 0 (Lu and Perrigne, 2008; Li and Tan,
2017), 0 ≤ w ≤ w̄, where w̄ is the upper support of wealth among n bidders
(Gentry et al., 2015) and w > %, where % is the entry cost of auction (Li et al.,
2015). However, none of these constraints incorporate the bid value which is
rather important because the bidder can pay the amount of her successful bid b
only when her wealth is greater than or equal to her bid i.e., w ≥ b. Indeed,
the utility function (3.4) will yield a positive utility even when b > w (as long as
w + v ≥ b) in which case the bidder does not have the ability to buy the item.
This is unrealistic.
For the sake of simplicity of the notation, we assume that the auction has no entry
cost. Alternatively, we could also assume that w is the wealth after discounting
the entry cost. Then, using (3.4), Brenda’s expected utility would be of the form
Ψ1 = (w + v − b)rF (b) + wr[1− F (b)], (3.5)
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where F (b) is Brenda’s probability of winning the auctioned item. The expected
utility function (3.5) has been used by Gentry et al. (2015). Li and Tan (2017), and
others using a game-theoretic perspective. Having w unconstrained with respect
to b can lead to unrealistic solutions. For example, not only can the optimal bid
value b∗ be greater than w, but also, b∗ could decrease as w increases, which is
inconsistent with the item being normal. We illustrate this using a simple example.
Example 3.1 Suppose that Brenda has true value v = $150 for the auctioned item
which has no reserve price. From her subjective belief about Charles, lets assume
that she elicits the distribution F (c) = 9c/(8 × 200) − c9/(8 × 2009) on Charles’s
bid c (Banks et al., 2015). To find her optimal bid, she can replace c by b to obtain
F (b), her probability of winning the item. Using the expected utility function (3.5),
Brenda can find her optimal bid by finding
b∗ = arg max
b∈IR+
[{w + v − b}rF (b) + wr{1− F (b)}].
Some numerical results are shown in Table 3.1. The table shows that b∗ increases
with increase in her risk-aversion, which is realistic. However, it also shows that b∗
decreases as her wealth w increases, which is unrealistic when the item is normal.
Further, it shows that b∗ can be much higher than her wealth w i.e. b∗ > w
especially for higher risk-aversion levels (r = 0.10 or 0.05).
Now, if we assume that w = 0, then the expected utility function (3.5) would be
Ψ1 = (v − b)rF (b). (3.6)
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Table 3.1: Brenda’s optimal bids b∗ using expected utility function (3.5) with different
wealth and risk aversion levels.
r 0.90 0.50 0.10 0.05
w = 0 78.93 99.88 135.84 148.38
w = 50 76.44 82.14 87.51 88.15
w = 150 75.69 78.46 81.12 81.44
This function has been used for risk-averse bidders by Cox et al. (1982a) and Cox
et al. (1985), among others, and by Banks et al. (2015) for risk-neutral bidders.
The first row of Table 3.1 shows Brenda’s optimal bids for this special case where
w = 0. Finding b∗ using (3.6) is also unrealistic again because b∗ > w.
3.2.2 New CRRA Parameters
When an item is normal, the bidders’ willingness to pay for it increases with
their wealth (Baisa, 2017). We propose to introduce an additional risk behaviour
parameter a that will change with the relative change in circumstances of each
bidder’s wealth. The original risk behaviour parameter r will remain unchanged
and will denote the baseline risk behaviour level of the bidder. This relative change
in circumstances could occur in two specific cases; firstly, when a bidder’s wealth
changes and secondly, when a bidder attempts to model the risk behaviour of an
opponent. We describe how the new parameter a can be defined in each of these
cases.
Firstly, to model Brenda’s risk behaviour at an increase level of her wealth com-
pared with her own lower level of wealth, we modify the CRRA parameter as
follows: we define rB to be Brenda’s baseline risk behaviour parameter, which
represents her natural risk appetite at her wealth, say w1. Note that rB is the
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same as the r we defined earlier in Subsection 3.1.3. Lets assume that her circum-
stances change (e.g. she gains an inheritance) and her wealth is increased to w2
(w2 > w1). At this increased wealth level, we expect her to be more risk-averse (or
less risk-seeking) for the same auctioned item (since the item is assumed normal).







B if 0 < rB < 1,
rB if rB = 1,
rhB if 1 < rB ≤ 2,
(3.7)
where, we define 0 < h = w1/w2 < 1, when w1 < w2.Note that here, for 0 < rB ≤ 2
(rB 6= 1), aB < rB, i.e. if Brenda was risk-averse (risk-seeking) at wealth level w1,
then she is even more risk-averse (less risk-seeking) at wealth level w2. Also, when
rB = 1, aB = rB, i.e. if Brenda was risk-neutral at wealth level w1, she is also
risk-neutral at wealth level w2. There is no change to her risk behaviour (that is,
aB = rB ) if her wealth decreases.
Secondly, when Brenda is bidding against Charles who has wealth wC , we modify
their CRRA parameters as follows: if Brenda believes that Charles has wealth
wC , we define RC as Brenda’s belief about Charles’s natural risk appetite for the
auctioned item. In this case, Brenda could draw RC from a uniform distribution
U with support (0, 1) if she believes that Charles is a risk-averse bidder. She
could draw RC from a uniform distribution U with support (1, 2] if she believes
that Charles is a risk-seeking bidder. In this case, we assume that Brenda has
wealth wB, where wB > wC , i.e. Brenda has more wealth than Charles. Thus,
Brenda’s risk behaviour parameter in this case would be same as defined in (3.7)
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with 0 < h = wC/wB < 1. However, if Brenda believes that Charles has more







C if 0 < RC < 1,
RC if RC = 1,
RhC if 1 < RC ≤ 2,
(3.8)
where 0 < h = wB/wC < 1 and AC < RC if Brenda believes that Charles is
risk-averse (risk-seeking) bidder in this case. Thus, AC may take values in the
interval (0, 1) if she believes that he is a risk-averse bidder. On the other hand if
she believes that he is a risk-seeking bidder, AC may take values in the interval
(1, 2h] and AC = 1, if she believes that he is a risk-neutral bidder. In this case,
Brenda’s risk behaviour parameter would remain unchanged i.e. it is aB = rB for
0 < rB ≤ 2.
3.2.3 New Utility Function
We propose to modify the utility function so that w ≥ b, i.e. a bidder’s bid value
cannot be greater than that bidder’s wealth. Additionally, since in equilibrium,
bidders never bid above their true values (Gentry et al., 2015), we in fact have
b ≤ v ≤ w, because a bidder can bid and pay an amount b ≤ v, only if the bidder’s
wealth is at least equal to the true value. Further, we assume that a bidder’s
wealth remains unchanged if the bid is unsuccessful.
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We propose to use the following utility function for Brenda:
u(b, v, w) =

w + (v − b)aB if she wins the bid,
w if she loses the bid,
(3.9)
where, aB is a modified CRRA parameter as defined in Section 3.2.2. Thus, for
our proposed utility function (3.9), Brenda’s expected utility would be of the form
Ψ2 = {w + (v − b)aB}F (b) + w{1− F (b)}. (3.10)
The above equation simplifies to
Ψ2 = w + (v − b)aBF (b). (3.11)
Thus, using (3.11), Brenda can find her optimal bid by solving the following equa-
tion
b∗ = arg max
b∈IR+
[w + (v − b)aBF (b)]. (3.12)
The utility function (3.9) is more realistic in the sense that it allows Brenda to
add up her profit to her wealth after the successful bid. It also allows Brenda to
bid strictly less than or equal to her true value v and consequently to bid less than
or equal to her wealth at any assumed level of her risk-aversion. Lets assume that
Brenda has wealth w = $150, true value v = $150 and F (b) as considered earlier
in this section. Then, using (3.12), she could get her optimal bids as shown in the
first row of Table 3.1 for different assumed risk-aversion levels. Note that she will
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get these values since her optimal bid is not affected by her wealth in (3.12). Thus,
this function gives the leverage to assume any wealth w ≥ v for Brenda and also
her optimal bid to be bounded above by her wealth for any assumed risk-aversion
level, i.e. b∗ ≤ v ≤ w.
We define (3.9) as Brenda’s wealth plus her profit where she could be risk-
neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking in her profit. Thus, by letting her profit v− b =
x, we can show that she has a CRRA profit in (3.9) since
d
dx
















where 1− aB is the coefficient of CRRA that incorporates the effect of increase in
wealth on bidders’ risk behaviour and is defined in Section 3.2.2.
3.3 Non-Strategic Play
In this section, we show how an ARA solution for Brenda’s optimal bid can be
found when she assumes that Charles is a non-strategic opponent and will bid
an amount that is independent of Brenda’s bid. We assume that Brenda bids
an amount b, having wealth wB and true value vB for the auctioned item. We
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assume that the auctioned item is normal and it has a reserve price τ such that
τ < b ≤ vB ≤ wB. We assume that τ is known in advance to each bidder. We
define Brenda’s wealth wB, as the money she has at her disposal. She does not
know about Charles’s wealthWC and places a distribution HBC on his wealth. She
also does not know about Charles’s true value VC and his bid C for the auctioned
item. So, she places a distribution GBC on his true value according to her belief
and then finds the distribution of his bid C, as defined in (3.14) below. For Charles,
she also believes that τ < c ≤ vC ≤ wC holds, where vC and wC are chosen by
Brenda from the distributions GBC and HBC , respectively. Brenda’s probability
of winning from a bid of amount b is given by
FBC(b) = Pr(C ≤ b),
where, FBC is the distribution over Charles’s bid with support (vC , v̄C ] ⊆ IR+,
vC ≥ τ , that Brenda believes and C is the random variable of her belief about
Charles’s bid. To obtain FBC , Brenda divides her introspection into two parts as
GBC , the cumulative distribution function (CDF) that quantifies her uncertainty
of Charles’s true value and TBC , the CDF that quantifies her uncertainty for the
fraction of Charles’s true value p = c/vC that he bids. Note that the supports for
GBC and TBC are (vC , v̄C ] and (vC/vC , 1], respectively. She can then derive her
subjective distribution function over C = PVC , the amount of Charles’s bid as

















tBC(p)dp = 1, the above equation simplifies to
FBC(c) = GBC(c) +
∫ v̄C
c
gBC(vC)TBC(c/vC) dvC , (3.14)
where, gBC(vC) is the probability density function for Charles’s true value that
Brenda elicits and tBC(p) is the probability density function for the fraction of
Charles’s true value that Brenda believes he will bid. Equation (3.13) assumes
that Charles’s true value VC and fraction of his true value P are independent.
In (3.13), the whole region of integration has been divided into two regions for
the random variables VC and P in order to find the distribution of C. Figure
3.2 shows the division of the integration region into these two regions. The area
between the two curves shows the integration region between vC and v̄C . The area
A corresponds to the first integral part whereas area B corresponds to the second












Figure 3.2: Region of integration when the bid is a proportion of the true value with
reserve price τ .
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Then, using (3.9), we rewrite Brenda’s expected utility function (3.10) as
ΨB(b) = {wB + (vB − b)aB}FBC(b) + wB{1− FBC(b)}.
This equation simplifies to
ΨB(b) = wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b), (3.15)
where FBC(b) is her probability that her bid b will be successful. Finally, Brenda’s
optimal bid b∗ may be found by solving the following equation
b∗ = arg max
vC≤b≤vB
[wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b)]. (3.16)
Numerical methods may often be needed to solve (3.16) for b∗. Note that b∗ is, in
fact, a function of aB and therefore, a function of rB and wC . Then rB, being the
baseline risk behaviour for Brenda, is constant. Therefore, we can re-write (3.16)
as
b∗(wC) = arg max
vC≤b≤vB
[wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b)]. (3.17)
If Brenda has information on Charles’s wealth, she can use (3.17) to find her
optimal bid amount. Alternatively, she can take into consideration her uncertainty




Comparing the derivation above with the ARA sketch provided in Section 3.1.2,
the reader can note that FBC(c) of (3.14) is the pB(c) in (3.2) obtained by as-
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suming that the opponent is a non-strategic player and that (3.15) provides the
expected utility ΨB(b) given in (3.1) for this particular problem. Also, note that in
the above analysis, we have assumed that all the probability distributions consid-
ered are continuous. If any of the distributions are discrete then the corresponding
integrals would be replaced by summations.
Example 3.2 Suppose Brenda’s true value for the item vB = $150, her wealth
wB = $150 and the auctioned item has a reserve price τ . She could elicit her
uncertainty on Charles’s true value using a uniform distribution GBC(vC) = (vC−
vC)/(v̄C − vC) with support (vC , v̄C ], vC ≥ τ . Since Brenda believes that Charles is
a non-strategic player whose bid amount will be independent of her bid, she could
assume a distribution on p, the proportion of Charles’s true value that Brenda
believes he will bid, given by TBC(p) = (p8−(vC/vC)8)/(1−(vC/vC)8) with support
(vC/vC , 1]. Finally, suppose that she has a uniform distribution HBC(wC) = (wC−
wC)/(w̄C − wC) on Charles’s wealth WC with support (wC , w̄C ] where wC ≥ vC .
Then we have gBC(vC) = 1/(v̄C − vC). Note that the distributions TBC(p) and
HBC elicited here are taken from Banks et al. (2015) but with the reserve price τ



























































































Suppose τ = $30 and Brenda believes that GBC has support (30, 200]. Then sub-
stituting these in (3.19), she can get FBC(b) which she can then use to find her
optimal bid by solving (3.16) which also takes into consideration her risk appetite.
Now, assuming that Brenda is a risk-neutral bidder i.e. aB = 1, her optimal bid
by solving (3.16) for wB = vB = $150 turns out to be $88.05 with probability of
winning of 0.415 and with the expected utility of 175.72.
Next, we assume that Brenda is a risk-averse bidder. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that Brenda chooses Charles’s wealth wC to be $150 from the distribution
HBC. We assume that Brenda’s baseline risk behaviour parameter is rB when her
wealth wB = $150. As her and Charles’s wealth are assumed to be the same, it
is natural to take aB = rB. If Brenda’s wealth was to increase to wB = $200,
then, we expect her to be more risk-averse than Charles because she is able (and
willing since the item is normal) to pay more to increase her chance of winning
the bid. By using (3.7), we model Brenda’s risk-aversion when wB = $200 relative
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B . In Table 3.2, we show how Brenda’s
optimal bids, her probabilities of winning and her expected utilities change with
change in her wealth and also how they change with the change in rB. It shows
that with increase in her wealth to wB = $200, she is more risk-averse and conse-
quently bids higher than when wB = $150. In general, it shows that an increase
in risk aversion leads to higher optimum bid (resulting in a higher probability of
winning that bid) but a lower expected utility nonetheless. We also plot these in
Figure 3.3.
Table 3.2: Brenda’s optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected utilities when
she is risk-averse and risk-neutral bidder and she thinks that wC = $150.
aB = rB
(wB = $150)
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
b∗(wC) 138.06 128.69 120.89 114.22 108.43 103.36 98.87 94.86 91.28 88.05
FBC(b
∗) 0.743 0.684 0.633 0.589 0.551 0.518 0.488 0.461 0.437 0.415





0.047 0.118 0.202 0.296 0.398 0.507 0.622 0.743 0.869 1.00
b∗(wC) 143.95 136.22 128.52 121.17 114.34 108.05 102.32 97.09 92.35 88.05
FBC(b
∗) 0.779 0.732 0.683 0.635 0.590 0.549 0.511 0.476 0.444 0.415
ΨB 200.85 201.00 201.27 201.72 202.45 203.65 205.65 209.08 215.05 225.72
But often, Brenda may instead be uncertain about WC and may prefer to take
into account her uncertainty and obtain her expected optimal value after doing
so. To do this, she can first elicit HBC and then solve (3.18) using Monte Carlo
methods. Suppose she believes that Charles’s wealth is uniformly distributed be-
tween $100 and $300. She will derive aB as described in Section 3.2.2, whereby,
aB = r
1/h
B , for h = wC/wB, when wB > wC and aB = rB otherwise. Since WC is
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(a) Brenda’s optimal bids.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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aB = r
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(b) Brenda’s probabilities of winning.
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(c) Brenda’s expected utilities.
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Brenda’s (risk-averse and risk-neutral) optimal bids, her prob-
abilities of winning and her expected utilities when she has wB = $150 and $200.
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a random variable, so will be AB. Then, her expected optimal bids, probabilities of
winning, and expected utilities are given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected util-
ities when she is risk-averse and risk-neutral bidder and draws WC from HBC .
rB
(wB = $200) 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
E(aB) 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.77 0.88 1.00
E(b∗) 140.91 132.52 124.73 117.94 111.84 106.19 100.89 96.21 91.89 88.05
FBC [E(b
∗)] 0.761 0.708 0.658 0.614 0.574 0.536 0.501 0.470 0.441 0.415
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 200.89 201.12 201.48 202.07 202.85 204.29 206.55 210.11 215.74 225.72
Finally, we find Brenda’s optimal bids, probabilities of winning and expected
utilities when she is assumed to be a risk-seeking bidder and wB = $150. These
are listed in Table 3.4. These show that as the risk seeking behaviour intensifies,
the optimal bids get lower and so does the probabilities of winning the bids. Again,
we can model how her bids will change if her wealth was to increase, to say $200.





B . It shows that with increase in her wealth, i.e. wB = $200,
she is less risk-seeking and consequently she bids higher than when wB = $150.
In general, it shows that an increase in risk seeking behaviour leads to a lower
optimum bid (resulting in a lower probability of winning that bid) but a higher
expected utility nonetheless. We also plot these results in Figure 3.4.
Once again, Brenda may prefer to take into account her uncertainty in WC and
obtain her expected optimal value after doing so. To do this, she can solve (3.18)
using Monte Carlo methods. Her expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning,
and expected utilities are given in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.4: Brenda’s optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected utilities when
she is risk-seeking and risk-neutral bidder and she thinks that wC = $150.
aB = rB
(wB = $150)
1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90
b∗(wC) 88.05 85.12 82.45 80.02 77.79 75.73 73.84 72.08 70.45 68.93
FBC(b
∗) 0.415 0.400 0.378 0.361 0.346 0.332 0.320 0.308 0.297 0.287





1.000 1.074 1.147 1.217 1.287 1.355 1.423 1.489 1.554 1.618
b∗(wC) 88.05 85.85 83.84 82.02 80.32 78.77 77.30 75.95 74.69 73.51
FBC(b
∗) 0.415 0.400 0.387 0.375 0.363 0.353 0.343 0.334 0.326 0.318
ΨB 225.72 234.91 247.42 263.68 285.50 314.32 352.85 402.99 469.06 554.90
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
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(a) Brenda’s optimal bids.
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(b) Brenda’s probabilities of winning.
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(c) Brenda’s expected utilities.
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Brenda’s (risk-seeking and risk-neutral) optimal bids, her
probabilities of winning and her expected utilities when she has wB = $150 and $200.
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Table 3.5: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected util-
ities when she is risk-seeking and risk-neutral bidder and draws WC from HBC .
rB
(wB = $200) 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90
E(aB) 1.00 1.09 1.17 1.26 1.34 1.42 1.51 1.60 1.68 1.76
E(b∗) 88.05 85.49 83.18 81.01 79.11 77.39 75.62 74.00 72.54 71.30
FBC [E(b
∗)] 0.415 0.398 0.383 0.368 0.355 0.344 0.332 0.320 0.311 0.301
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 225.72 237.36 252.22 276.33 307.23 350.94 422.22 527.87 664.06 857.73
3.4 Level-k Thinking
We will now show how an ARA solution for a two player FPSB auction can be de-
rived when Brenda believes that Charles is a level-k thinker. In a level-k analysis,
we model how deeply the opponent thinks about the problem (Stahl and Wilson,
1995). It is not only an important solution concept to be considered for a strategic
adversary (Banks et al., 2015) but also provides the flexibility to model the oppo-
nent at different levels of strategic thinking including being a non-strategic player
(when k = 0). If the decision maker performs a level-k analysis, she believes that
her opponent is a level-(k − 1) thinker who would model her as a level-(k − 2)
player. For instance, when k = 1, she believes that her opponent is a level-0
thinker, that is, a non-strategic player. A level-2 analysis means that the decision
maker assumes that her opponent is a level-1 thinker, who believes that she is a
level-0 thinker. A level-3 analysis means that the decision maker assumes that her
opponent is a level-2 thinker who models her as a level-1 thinker and so on. So,
in such type of modelling, the decision maker attempts to think one level deeper
than her opponent.
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The key question is how large should the k be? In principle, k could take
higher values. One could argue that players could choose a higher k when playing
highly structured games such as Chess or Go. However, Ho et al. (1998) and Lee
and Wolpert (2012) presented experimental evidence that in practice people do
not usually think higher than level 2 or 3. Therefore, for FPSB auctions, it makes
sense to solve the level-k problem for k being 1, 2 or 3.
As described earlier, we extend the work by Banks et al. (2015). We derive
Brenda’s optimal bid for the level-k thinking solution concept assuming not only
that she and Charles are risk-neutral bidders but also when they are risk-averse
or risk-seeking bidders. Also, we consider their wealth as well as assume that the
auctioned item has a reserve price τ when deriving the optimal bid.
For k = 1 , where Brenda believes herself to be a level-1 thinker and models
Charles as a level-0 (non-strategic) thinker, the problem is identical to the non-
strategic thinking problem modeled in Section 3.3.
Here, we derive ARA solution for the case where k = 2 . In this case, Brenda
models herself as a level-2 thinker and believes that Charles is a level-1 thinker,
who (Charles) models Brenda as a level-0 thinker. Brenda performs ARA by
placing a subjective distribution GBCB with support (vCB, v̄CB] on her true value
VCB that Charles might elicit, a distribution TBCB with support (vCB/VCB, 1]
on the fraction of her true value that she thinks Charles would think that she
would bid. This allows her to derive FBCB using (3.14) (but with roles reversed)
with support (bCB, b̄CB] that she believes is the distribution of her bid that Charles
might elicit. She would then elicit a distribution HBCB on her wealth with support
(wCB, w̄CB], where wCB ≥ vCB and w̄CB ≥ v̄CB, that she thinks Charles would
elicit, a distribution GBC with support (vC , v̄C ] on Charles’s true value VC , and
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HBC with support (wC , w̄C ] on Charles’s wealthWC where wC ≥ vC and w̄C ≥ v̄C .
She can then find his optimal bid for given wB, wC , vC and rC as
C∗(wB, wC , vC , rC) = arg max
c>vCB
[wC + (vC − c)aCFBCB(c)],
where vCB ≥ τ and AC is defined in (3.8). Here, h = WB/WC . As described in
Section 3.2.2, Brenda could elicit a distribution on RC . This distribution, along
with HBCB and HBC would allow her to derive the distribution for AC which we
shall denote by SBC . She can then find the expected value of Charles’s optimal bid
that she thinks he will derive as a level-1 thinker as
E(C∗) =
∫ ∫
C∗(wB, wC , vC , rC) dGBC(vC) dSBC(aC).
Using E(C∗) and a representative value of VC ∼ GBC (say, E(VC)) she can find
E(C∗)/E(VC) = q, the fraction of Charles’s true value that Brenda believes he
may bid. Now, she can find the distribution FBC of Charles’s bid C using the
change of variable formula as




Finally, she would obtain her optimal bid for a given value of wC by solving
b∗(wC) = arg max
b>δ
[wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b)], (3.21)
where δ = qvC and aB is Brenda’s risk-behaviour parameter defined in (4.4). If
Brenda has information on Charles’s wealth, she can use (3.21) to find her optimal
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bid amount. Alternatively, she can take into consideration her uncertainty around
wC and find the expected value of her optimal bid using (3.18).
Comparing the derivation above with the ARA sketch provided in Section 4.1.1,
the reader can note that fBC(c) in (3.20) gives the pB(c) in (3.2), obtained by as-
suming that the opponent is a level-1 thinker and that (3.15) provides the expected
utility ΨB(b) defined in (3.1) for this particular problem. Also, note that in the
above analysis, we have assumed that all the probability distributions considered
are continuous. If any of the distributions are discrete then the corresponding
integrals would be replaced by summations.
Example 3.3 Suppose Brenda’s true value for the item vB = $150, her wealth
wB = $200 and the auctioned item has a reserve price τ = $30. She, as a level-2
thinker, thinks that Charles is a level-1 thinker who would model her as a non-
strategic player (level-0 thinker). She believes that:
• Charles would model her true value for the auctioned item as being uniformly
distributed with support ($30, $200], i.e., GBCB = (vCB − 30)/(200− 30).
• Charles would elicit his uncertainty around the fraction of her true value
that she would bid as TBCB = (p8− (30/vCB)8)/(1− (30/vCB)8) with support
(30/vCB, 1].
• Charles would elicit his uncertainty around her wealth to be uniformly dis-
tributed on ($150, $250], i.e., HBCB = (wCB − 150)/(250− 150).
• Charles’s true value is uniformly distributed as GBC = (vC−100)/(200−100)
with support ($100, $200].
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• Charles’s wealth is uniformly distributed as HBC = (wC − 100)/(300− 100)
with support ($100, $300].
Once she has elicited these, then following the algorithm below e.g., when she
and Charles are risk-averse bidders, she can perform Monte Carlo simulations
to derive her expected optimal bid E(b∗), her probability of winning using that
expected optimal bid, FBC [E(b∗)], and her expected utility at that expected optimal
bid ΨB[E(b∗)] for various levels of her risk behaviour as well as for the various levels
of risk behaviour of Charles. These are summarised in Tables 3.6 to 3.9 below,

















and the mean of this distribution is 112.45. While both in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, we
















and the mean of this distribution is 77.36.
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Level-2 Thinking: Algorithm when Brenda and Charles are Risk-Averse
1. Sample wBC ∼ HBCB
2. Sample wC ∼ HBC
3. Sample vC ∼ GBC
4. Sample rC ∼ UBC(0, 1)
5. Define h = min(1, wBC
wC
)
6. Calculate aC = r
1/h
C
7. Find FBCB from (3.14) using GBCB and TBCB
8. Solve numerically
C∗(wB, wC , vC , rC) = arg max
vCB<c≤vC
[wC + (vC − c)aCFBCB(c)]
9. Repeat (1) to (8) N times (number of simulations)
10. Calculate q = E(C∗)/E(VC)
11. Find fBC = |J |gBC = gBC/q and thus find FBC
12. Set wB = 200 and vB = 150
13. Sample wC ∼ HBC
14. Let rB = 0.1
15. Define h = min(1, wC
wB
)
16. Calculate aB = r
1/h
B
17. Using FBC found in (11), solve numerically
b∗(wC) = arg max
b≤vB
[wB + (vB − b)aBFBC(b)]
18. Repeat (12) to (17) N times
19. Find E(b∗), E(aB), FBC [E(b∗)] and ΨB[E(b∗)]
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Table 3.6: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected util-
ities when she is a risk-averse bidder and she assumes that Charles is also a risk-averse
bidder.
rB 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
E(aB) 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.77 0.88 1.00
E(b∗) 144.88 139.76 135.08 130.85 127.05 123.56 120.31 117.42 114.83 112.48
FBC [E(b
∗)] 0.933 0.864 0.802 0.746 0.695 0.648 0.605 0.566 0.532 0.500
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 201.05 201.25 201.58 202.10 202.76 203.52 205.67 208.28 212.20 218.78
Table 3.7: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected util-
ities when she is a risk-seeking bidder and she assumes that Charles is a risk-averse
bidder.
rB 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90
E(aB) 1.00 1.09 1.17 1.26 1.34 1.43 1.52 1.60 1.68 1.76
E(b∗) 112.48 110.92 109.50 108.18 107.01 105.91 104.83 103.88 103.03 102.22
FBC [E(b
∗)] 0.500 0.480 0.461 0.443 0.427 0.413 0.398 0.386 0.374 0.363
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 218.78 226.07 235.00 248.91 266.01 292.70 330.51 377.20 440.95 528.11
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Table 3.8: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected utili-
ties when she is a risk-seeking bidder and she assumes that Charles is also a risk-seeking
bidder.
rB 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90
E(aB) 1.00 1.09 1.17 1.26 1.34 1.43 1.52 1.60 1.68 1.76
E(b∗) 100.79 98.73 96.90 95.19 93.63 92.13 90.76 89.53 88.38 87.38
FBC [E(b
∗)] 0.954 0.914 0.879 0.846 0.815 0.786 0.760 0.736 0.714 0.694
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 246.96 266.81 291.68 331.28 381.06 460.58 575.91 721.59 924.83 1208.68
Table 3.9: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, probabilities of winning and her expected util-
ities when she is a risk-averse bidder and she assumes that Charles is a risk-seeking
bidder.
rB 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
E(aB) 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.77 0.88 1.00
E(b∗) 143.27 136.65 130.75 125.00 120.00 115.14 111.06 107.36 103.85 100.79
FBC [E(b
∗)] 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.954
ΨB[E(b
∗)] 201.14 201.51 202.09 203.08 204.47 207.05 211.21 217.99 229.14 246.96
Now, we provide a brief sketch of how Brenda would find the ARA solution
when she wants to perform a level-3 analysis. In this case, k = 3 and Brenda
assumes that Charles is a level-2 thinker who would model Brenda as a level-1
thinker and believes that Brenda would model Charles as level-0 thinker. To find
the ARA solution in this case, Brenda would perform the level-2 analysis detailed
above for Charles and obtain his optimal bid C∗(WB) using (3.21). Using (3.21)
and using Monte Carlo methods to incorporate the uncertainty in WB, she would
get her belief about FBC , the distribution of Charles’s (level-2 thinker) bid. She
can then obtain her optimal bid b∗(wC) or the expected value of her optimal bid
E(b∗) using similar process as in (3.17) and (3.18), respectively.
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3.5 Conclusion and Further Work
In this chapter, we propose a better way to model the FPSB auctions than what
has previously been done. Specifically, we assume that the item being auctioned
is a normal item. First, we propose a new utility function that is realistic and
constrains the bid value and true value in consideration with the wealth of the
bidder, and a new CRRA parameter that models the change in risk behaviour of
the bidder with increase in their wealth, as would be expected for a normal item.
Secondly, we model the problem using the ARA approach and here we extend the
ARA solution developed by Banks et al. (2015) to consider the reserve price, to
include not only risk-neutral but also, risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders and to
allow each bidder to have different wealth.
In this chapter, we show how an ARA solution for an FPSB auction problem can
be derived when assuming that the adversary is a non-strategic player and when
assuming that they are a level-k thinker instead. We provide numerical examples
to illustrate these solutions. The solutions are very easy to be found using a ba-
sic Monte Carlo approach. The example shows that overall, the optimal bids for
risk-averse bidders are higher than risk-neutral bidders and that the optimal bids
increase as the level of risk aversion increases. In contrast, but as expected, the
optimal bids for the risk-seeking bidders are lower than risk-neutral bidders and
the optimal bids decrease as the level of risk-seeking behaviour intensifies. The
examples also highlight that the probability of winning the bid increases with risk
aversion and decreases with risk-seeking behaviour. Further, it also shows that a
bidder would typically bid higher with an increase in their relative wealth.
While it is possible for the defender to model the problem using ARA by assuming
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various solution concepts for the adversary, it may be possible that the defender
does not know how their adversary may solve the problem and therefore needs to
incorporate concept (model) uncertainty into their solutions. This can be easily
done (Banks et al., 2015).
The practical challenge in adopting a Bayesian approach of incorporating uncer-
tainties using prior distributions is the elicitation of these distributions. Ríos Insua
et al. (2016) provide an outline for a robustness analysis for ARA. It is important
to investigate the sensitivity of the optimal bid to any errors or mis-specifications
in the utilities and the probabilities elicited for the analysis. Robustness analysis
of ARA to these elicitations is necessary, but has yet to be developed.
ARA solutions for FPSB auctions for other solution concepts such as the BNE,
mirror equilibrium or minimax approach have yet to be derived. Also, we have
derived solutions for a two person game. General solutions for n-player games
have to be derived too. Finally, other utility functions have also been proposed to
model FPSB auctions, for example, the utility function that incorporates bidders’
winning and losing regret such as used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007).
ARA solutions for a different utility function such as this one have to be derived
and sensitivity of the ARA solution to the choice of the utility function needs to
be studied as well.
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Chapter 4
Adversarial Risk Analysis for
Auctions using Mirror Equilibrium
and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
In this chapter, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model
first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We find ARA
solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts,
not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also




4.1.1 Modelling FPSB Auctions
A decision theorist typically uses her personal probabilities in a way as described
by Savage (1954) and these probabilities describe her subjective beliefs about the
possible actions that her rivals may take. For auctions, a decision theorist aims
to find her optimal bid by assessing the probability distribution of the best com-
petitive bid while she assumes that the other bidders are non-strategic. Friedman
(1956) presented the first modern academic paper that used a decision-theoretic
model for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions1. Decision theorists argue that,
in practice, bidders make use of a decision-theoretic approach rather than a game-
theoretic approach for auctions (see e.g. Capen et al., 1971; Keefer et al., 1991;
Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994; Rothkopf, 2007; Wang and Guo, 2017; Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok, 2007, among others).
On the other hand, a Bayesian game theorist assumes that her opponents are
strategic, they draw their valuations for the auctioned item from the commonly
known distributions to all bidders and then they all find a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium (BNE) bidding strategy. Using a Bayesian game-theoretic approach, Vickrey
(1961) modelled FPSB auctions assuming that n bidders draw their valuations
from a commonly known uniform distribution. Criesmer et al. (1967); Wilson
(1969); Riley and Samuelson (1981); Cox et al. (1982a,b); Maskin and Riley (2000);
Goeree et al. (2002); Bajari (2001); Campo et al. (2011); Gentry et al. (2015); Li
1Bidders place their bids in sealed envelopes and simultaneously hand over them to the auc-
tioneer. Those envelopes are then opened and the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the
amount equal to the bid.
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and Tan (2017) among others also analysed these auctions using a Bayesian game-
theoretic approach.
Consider the FPSB auction in which n ≥ 2 bidders compete to buy a single
auctioned item. Let the ith bidder’s value and bid for the auctioned item be vi
and bi, respectively, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The ith bidder will win the auctioned
item if bi = b∗, the highest bid, and in that case, will realize an economic profit
of vi − b∗. As one would expect, the probability of winning would increase with
an increase in bid but the profit would then decrease. Thus, the bidder has to
balance between the desirable increase in winning probability and the undesirable
decrease in profit.
We follow Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and sketch how the Bayesian game-
theoretic solution for an asymmetric FPSB auction has been found in the literature
of auctions. It is assumed that the bidders randomly draw their valuations for the
item from the distributions Gi[vi] for i = 1, . . . , n which are commonly known to
all bidders with common support [v, v̄]. We are interested in finding the BNE bid
functions. Let bi(vi) be the bid function that typically maps the ith bidder’s values
to her bids and gives her optimum bid given her true value vi. It is assumed that
the bid functions are strictly monotonically increasing in bidders’ valuations; i.e.,
bidders’ bids increase with increase in their true values. This monotone nature
of bi(vi) allows us to write vi as a function of bi. The function that maps the ith
bidder’s bids to her values is called the inverse bid function and denoted by vi(bi).
Suppose that the bidders use the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function
u(b; v) = (v − b)r, (4.1)
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where (1 − r) = −wu′′(w)/u′(w) is the coefficient of CRRA or Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure of relative risk aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965). Then, the BNE bid
functions bi(vi) could be found by maximizing each expected utility function with
respect to its argument bi. In most cases, no closed-form solution exists and nu-
merical methods are thus required to find bi(vi). Marshall et al. (1994) found
numerical solutions for asymmetric auctions with risk-neutral bidders by adopt-
ing the shooting algorithm for solving the differential equation formulation of the
problem. Bajari (2001); Fibich and Gavious (2003); Gayle and Richard (2008);
Hubbard and Paarsch (2009); Fibich and Gavish (2011); Hubbard and Paarsch
(2014) among others also gave numerical solutions for these auctions when the
bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral.
These works did not include numerical solutions when the bidders are risk-averse
or risk-seeking. Moreover, the utility function (4.1) does not take into account
bidders’ wealth and also has other limitations (Ejaz et al., 2021, or Chapter 3).
Further, Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and others found the BNE solution under
the common prior assumption; i.e., each bidder knows the valuation distributions
of the other bidders and that this is common knowledge, which is also not realistic
as discussed below.
4.1.2 Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA)
Both the decision and game-theoretic approaches have their drawbacks in practice.
It may be unrealistic to assume other bidders are non-strategic as in a decision-
theoretic approach because bidders may often be strategic. On the other hand, the
common knowledge assumption about the valuation distributions in the Bayesian
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game-theoretic model can also be unrealistic because the distribution used by one
bidder is usually not commonly known to others. In fact, often the bidders try to
keep their bids secret in order to win the auctioned item and to gain a competitive
advantage. Also, it becomes more difficult to find a BNE as the games get more
complex and thus it may be possible that a unique BNE solution for such a game
does not exist.
Ríos Insua et al. (2009) introduced an approach called adversarial risk anal-
ysis (ARA) to overcome the drawbacks of both decision-theoretic and Bayesian
game-theoretic approaches. ARA takes into account the presence of an intelligent
adversary and models strategic decision-making problems for which some specific
examples are given below. ARA adopts a Bayesian approach and uses subjective
prior distributions to elicit the uncertainty around the unknown beliefs, capabil-
ities and preferences of the intelligent adversary as well as around the possible
outcomes. However, ARA differs from Bayesian game theory in a number of im-
portant ways. Unlike Bayesian game theory, (i) ARA does not assume that these
subjective distributions are commonly known to all players; (ii) ARA allows for
different assumptions about the strategy of the intelligent adversary and these
result in different solution concepts such as non-strategic play, level-k thinking,
mirror equillibria (ME) or BNE; and finally, (iii) ARA solves the decision-making
problem from the perspective of just one of the players and does not need to find
an equilibrium solution for all players as in Bayesian game theory. Thus, an ARA
solution is comparatively easy to find even for more complex decision-making prob-
lems.
ARA has been used to model a variety of real life decision-making problems such
as network routing for insurgency (Wang and Banks, 2011), international piracy
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(Sevillano et al., 2012), counter-terrorism (Rios and Ríos Insua, 2012), autonomous
social agents (Esteban and Ríos Insua, 2014), urban security resource allocation
(Gil et al., 2016), adversarial classification (Naveiro et al., 2019), counter-terrorist
online surveillance (Gil and Parra-Arnau, 2019), cyber-security (Ríos Insua et al.,
2021), insider threat (Joshi et al., 2021) and FPSB auctions (Ejaz et al., 2021, or
Chapter 3) among others.
ARA solutions for FPSB auctions have been found previously. Banks et al. (2015)
modelled these auctions assuming that each bidder is risk-neutral. They did not
consider the bidder’s wealth and also did not take into account the reserve price for
the auctioned item. Ejaz et al. (2021) extended this work by using a more realistic
utility function (4.2) (defined in the following Section 4.1.3) and by incorporat-
ing the risk behavior of bidders who may have different wealth. However, they
only derived ARA solutions for the ‘non-strategic play’ and the ‘level-k thinking’
solution concepts.
4.1.3 Utility Function for FPSB Auctions
In economic theory, a good that has positive income elasticity is defined as a
normal good. That is, demand for a normal good rises when income increases and
falls when the income falls (see, for example, Fisher, 1990; Goeree et al., 2002;
Piros and Pinto, 2013; Perloff, 2015; Baisa, 2017, for more details).
In the context of auctions, it is important to note that risk relates to the risk of
not winning the item. A risk-neutral bidder is one who is indifferent to risk when
making a bidding decision. A risk-averse bidder is a bidder who does not want to
lose the item and bids more aggressively than a risk-neutral bidder. Whereas, a
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risk-seeking bidder is keen to get the item at a low price and bids less aggressively
than a risk-neutral one.
Baisa (2017) stated that when bidding on a normal item, the bidders’ willing-
ness to pay for the auctioned item increases with their wealth. Thus, bidding on a
normal item, bidders could be more risk-averse (or less risk-seeking) with increase
in their wealth. Assuming two bidders, Ejaz et al. (2021) proposed a modified
risk behavior parameter that changes with the relative change in circumstances
of the bidders’ wealth. This modified risk behavior parameter is defined later in
Section 4.2.2 for the general case of n bidders.
With n bidders, we define the utility function for the ith bidder as
u(bi, vi, wi) =

wi + (vi − bi)ai if she wins the bid,
wi if she loses the bid,
(4.2)
where wi is the wealth, ai is a modified CRRA parameter and vi is her true value
of the item. This utility function takes into account the bidders’ wealth, risk
appetite and change in risk behavior due to perceived relative wealth in relation
to other bidders’ wealth. Therefore, as explained in more detail in Ejaz et al.
(2021) or Chapter 3 that the utility function given in (4.2) is considered to be a
more realistic one for auctions compared to the standard CRRA utility function of
the form (wi + vi − bi)ri used previously, for instance, by Lu and Perrigne (2008);
Gentry et al. (2015); Li and Tan (2017), etc. Using the utility function (4.2), we
make the natural assumption that bi ≤ vi ≤ wi, because the ith bidder does not
want to bid more than the true value and can pay an amount bi ≤ vi only if the
bidder’s wealth is at least equal to the true value. Thus, using the utility function
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(4.2), the ith bidder’s expected utility for a bid bi would be of the form
Ψi(bi) = {wi + (vi − bi)ai}F (bi) + wi{1− F (bi)},
where F (bi) is her probability of winning the item from a bid bi. The above
equation simplifies to
Ψi(bi) = wi + (vi − bi)aiF (bi). (4.3)
Thus, using (4.3), the ith bidder can find her optimal bid by solving the equation
max
bi
[wi + (vi − bi)aiF (bi)].
4.1.4 Contributions in this Chapter
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We assume that the auctioned item is normal and extend Banks et al. (2015)
and Ejaz et al. (2021) or Chapter 3 by developing ARA solutions for mirror
equilibrium and BNE solution concepts, wherein,
• we assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price τ (typically,
known to each bidder in advance),
• we take into account bidders’ wealth,
• we find solutions not only for risk-neutral bidders but also for risk-averse
and risk-seeking bidders.
• We extend the work of Hubbard and Paarsch (2014), wherein,
• we solve the problem using ARA,
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• we take into account bidders’ wealth,
• we use the utility function (4.2) and find numerical solutions using the
shooting algorithm for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders.
4.1.5 Structure of the Chapter
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes how ARA
works and presents an asymmetric FPSB auction model along with its BNE so-
lution using the utility function (4.2). We also generalize the shooting algorithm
found in Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) to allow risk-averse and risk-seeking behav-
ior of bidders while assuming that the bidders have different wealths. Section 4.3
explains how an ARA solution can be found for the mirror equilibrium solution
concept for two bidders. In Section 4.4, ARA solutions for the BNE solution con-
cept for FPSB auctions are developed. Finally, Section 4.5 contains a discussion
of the results obtained in this chapter and areas for future research.
4.2 Asymmetric FPSB Auctions Model
In this Section, we present the general ARA framework for FPSB auctions. We
also derive the BNE solution for these auctions using the utility function (4.2) and
discuss the shooting algorithm to find the numerical solution.
4.2.1 ARA Framework for FPSB Auctions
We consider a two player game between Brenda (B) and Charles (C) in order to
give a general insight into the ARA framework. Let the choices that B and C make
87
be denoted by b and c from their respective set of actions B and C, respectively.
The resulting outcome, denoted by S, is a chance variable and takes the values
from a set of possible outcomes S. Let the utilities received by B and C from a
pair of actions (b, c) and outcome s be denoted by the utility functions uB(b, c, s)
and uC(b, c, s), respectively. Suppose we solve the problem from Brenda’s per-
spective. Among other objectives, of course, a typical objective could be to find
her optimal choice b∗ that maximizes her expected utility. This game could be
represented by a bi-agent influence diagram (BAID) as shown in Figure 4.1 where
decision, chance and utility nodes are denoted by rectangles, circles and hexagons,
respectively. Figure 4.1a represents this game from both B and C’s point of view
while Figure 4.1b represents this game from only B’s point of view where she is
uncertain about C’s choices and thus, C’s decision node is now a chance node for









Figure 4.1: (a) The BAID for the two player game (b) The BAID for the two players
from Brenda’s perspective
ARA is typically solved using backward induction, where, one first considers
the very last node and then solves for each node in the reverse order until one
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reaches the starting node. To find an ARA solution of the game from Brenda’s
perspective, we need to integrate out the uncertainties at chance nodes C and S
to reach the decision node B that maximise her expected utility. Thus, an ARA
solution of this game could be found as follows.
We start with Brenda’s expected utility while taking into account her uncertainty
about the outcomes S
ΨB(b, c) =
∫
uB(b, c, s)pB(s|b, c)ds,
where pB(s|b, c) is B’s uncertainty in S given b and c. Then, we take into account




where pB(c) is Brenda’s uncertainty in C. Finally, we find the optimal choice b∗
that maximises her expected utility as
b∗ = arg max
b∈B
ΨB(b).
The determination of pB(c) in the above modelling is the main challenge. Brenda
may elicit pB(c) either by using an expert opinion or by using data on Charles’s
past choices for a similar problem or by her subjective beliefs. On the other hand,
Brenda could also elicit pB(c) by modelling Charles’s strategic thinking process.
For instance, she may believe that Charles is also an expected utility maximizer
like she is and may make the choice c∗ to maximise his expected utility. She
can aim to find c∗, if she knows about Charles’s utility function uC(b, c, s) and
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his probabilities pC(b) and pC(s|b, c). However, uC(b, c, s), pC(b) and pC(s|b, c) are
usually unknown to her. She can model her uncertainty about Charles’s utility and
his probabilities by eliciting a random utility UC(b, c, s) and random probabilities
PC(b) and PC(s|b, c). If Brenda thinks that Charles is an expected utility maxi-
mizer, she can find Charles’s random optimal choice C∗ similar to how she finds
her own as described above. However, Charles could be assumed to use a number
of alternative solution concepts and thus pB(c) could be determined accordingly.
Note that in this chapter, we elicit pB(c) by eliciting GB[vB(c)], the cumulative
distribution on the equilibrium inverse bid function that Charles will bid c.
Ejaz et al. (2021) or Chapter 3 found ARA solutions for FPSB auctions from
Brenda’s perspective using the utility function (4.2) for the cases where she assumes
that Charles is a non-strategic player or that he is a level-k thinker. In Section 4.3,
we find ARA solutions from Brenda’s perspective, when she thinks that Charles
will find his optimal bid using a mirror equilibrium solution concept. Then in
Section 4.4, we find an ARA solution when she believes that her opponents use
BNE to find their optimal bids. The ARA solutions we derive in Sections 4.3 and
4.4 turn out to be based on the BNE solution for asymmetric FPSB auctions using
the utility function (4.2). Therefore, we first derive the BNE solution in the next
Section.
4.2.2 BNE Solution using Utility Function (4.2)
Here we derive the BNE solution for our asymmetric FPSB auction model which
is based upon the utility function (4.2). Suppose that we have n bidders and
they draw their valuations independently from other bidders. We assume that
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the auctioned item has a reserve price τ (typically, known to each bidder in ad-
vance).The bidder who bids the largest among n bidders wins the auction, and
pays the amount equal to the bid.
We assume three types of asymmetries in our model. The first type of asym-
metry is that the valuation distribution for each bidder is different; i.e., we assume
that the bidders draw their valuations from the distributions Gi(vi) with common
support [v, v̄] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n such that v ≥ τ . The second type of asymmetry
is that the bidders are assumed to be heterogeneous in their risk behavior (risk-
neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking). Finally, the third type of asymmetry is that
the bidders draw their wealth from different distributions Hi(wi) with support
[wi, w̄i] such that wi ≥ v for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that those distributions may
have different supports (not necessarily common). This third type of asymmetry,
in particular, has not been considered previously in the literature of asymmetric
FPSB auctions.
Ejaz et al. (2021) or Chapter 3 introduced a modified risk behavior parameter
assuming two bidders. This modification is based on the theory of normal goods
and assumes that a bidder will be willing to pay more for an item (that is, become
more risk averse or less risk seeking) if they think that they have relatively more
wealth compared to other bidders. We generalize it for the case when we have n
bidders. We assume that each bidder has a baseline risk behavior parameter ri,
i = 1, . . . , n, which represents the ith bidder’s natural risk appetite. This ri can
then be used to derive a modified risk parameter ai which will be dependent on
the ith bidder’s wealth relative to other bidders. This modified risk parameter as
will be different from rs only if the sth player is considered to be the wealthiest
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among all bidders, else ai = ri, for all i 6= s. In the rest of this Section, we treat
the situation as being from the perspective of the ith bidder.
Suppose that wi is the ith bidder’s wealth and she believes that she is the
wealthiest among all n bidders. She also believes that the jth bidder having
wealth wj is the wealthiest among the other (n − 1) bidders. In this case, we






i if 0 < ri < 1,
ri if ri = 1,
rhi if 1 < ri ≤ 2,
(4.4)
where 0 < h = wj/wi < 1. Here, the ith bidder becomes more risk-averse (or
less risk-seeking) as she believes she is wealthiest among all n bidders. She would
also believe that the other (n − 1) bidders’ (including the jth bidder) modified
risk behavior parameter would be equal to their baseline risk behavior parameter;
i.e., as = rs for s = 1, 2, . . . , n, s 6= i. On the other hand, if she believes that
the jth bidder is the wealthiest bidder among all n bidders, she can find aj, the
jth bidder’s modified risk behavior parameter from (4.4) by replacing i with j and
taking h = wi/wj < 1. In this situation, we also assume that she would then
model the (n− 1) bidders’ (including her own) risk behavior as being unchanged
so that as = rs for s = 1, 2, . . . , n, s 6= j.
Now, using the utility function (4.2), the expected utility of the ith bidder from
making a bid bi is
Ψi = wi + (vi − bi)aiPr(win|bi). (4.5)
92
Following Hubbard and Paarsch (2014), let Bs and Vs, s = 1, . . . , n, s 6= i, be the
random (unknown) bids and true values of the other (n− 1) bidders, respectively.
Assuming that the bidders are independent in making their bids, the ith bidder
would win the auction if





where Gs[vs(bi)] are the distribution functions on the inverse bid function for the
other (n− 1) bidders. Thus, Equation (4.5) becomes




Our motive is to find the BNE bid functions bi(vi). This could be done by max-
imizing each expected utility function with respect to its argument bi. Thus, the
first order condition for (4.6) is
dΨi
dbi


























where, gs[vs(bi)] are the probability distributions on the inverse bid function for
the other (n − 1) bidders. Now, to find the BNE inverse bid functions, we can
replace bi with a general bid b and vi with vi(b) because in the asymmetric setting
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, i = 1, . . . , n. (4.8)
94
Let b̄ be the common highest possible bid and b be the common lowest possible
bid. Then, as vi(b) = b(v) = v, the following are the boundary conditions on the
equilibrium inverse bid functions:
vi(b) = v (or equivalently vi(v) = v), Left boundary condition,
vi(b̄) = v̄, Right boundary condition,
(4.9)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. The solution to the system of ODEs (4.8) is needed which
satisfy both of the boundary conditions on the inverse bid functions. Note that
Equation (4.8) based on the utility function (4.2) turns out to be the same as
found by Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and others based on the utility function
(4.1). Whereas, in (4.8), we have incorporated the effect of bidders’ wealth on
their bidding behavior in the form of a modified risk behavior parameter ai as
defined in (4.4) rather than just the baseline risk behavior parameter ri which has
been used by Hubbard and Paarsch (2014) and others. In general, no closed-form
solution of (4.8) exists and numerical methods are thus required.
Boundary-value problems may be solved numerically by repeatedly solving ini-
tial value problems until the boundary conditions are satisfied. The algorithms
that use this approach are known as shooting algorithms. In these shooting algo-
rithms, one of the boundary conditions is treated as an initial value and the other
as the target value. For the left boundary condition vi(v) = v, we a priori know
both the valuation and the bid while for the right boundary condition vi(b̄) = v̄, we
only know the valuation v̄, but not the common highest possible bid b̄. Because
of this, we treat the right boundary condition as the initial value with b̄ to be
found iteratively and the left boundary condition as the target value. The shoot-
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ing algorithm using this approach is given below. If the guess for b̄ (denoted by b̄k
in the given algorithm) is too low at a particular iteration, then the approximate
solutions will not satisfy the target value at the left boundary condition. In this
case, b̄k needs to be increased for the next iteration. If b̄k is too high, then di-
vergence occurs in which case the guess needs to be decreased for the next iteration.
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The Shooting Algorithm
For a pre-specified tolerance ε, the shooting algorithm can be summarised as fol-
lows:
1. Find the values of the modified risk behavior parameters as which are a
function of wealth ws and the baseline risk behavior parameter rs for the sth
bidder, s = 1, . . . , n.
2. Set δ = 0.01 and k = 1.
3. Make a guess for the common high bid (initial value) b̄1 ∈ [v, v̄].
4. Solve the system of ODE’s (4.8) backwards on the interval [v, b̄k] to obtain
approximate equilibrium inverse bid functions vs,k(b), s = 1, . . . , n.
5. Evaluate vs,k(b) at b = v for s = 1, . . . , n to decide whether to decrease,
increase or stop at the guessed value b̄k. Specifically:
If the solution at v diverges, decrease the guessed value b̄k by setting
b̄k+1 = (1− δ)b̄k. Then set k = k + 1 and go back to Step 4;
else if the solution at v is in [v, v̄], but does not meet the pre-specified
tolerance criteria for at least one bidder (that is, |vs,k(v) − v| > ε for
some s), increase the guessed value b̄k by setting b̄k+1 = (1+δ)b̄k. Then
set k = k + 1 and go back to Step 4;
else stop if the solution at v converges, that is,
|vs,k(v)− v| ≤ ε for all s = 1, . . . , n,
and take vs,k(b) to be v̂s(b), the approximate solution of (4.8).
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4.3 ARA for FPSB Auctions using Mirror Equilib-
rium (ME)
In a level-k analysis, the decision maker believes that her opponent is a level-(k−1)
thinker who models her as a level-(k−2) player and so on where k = 1, 2, . . .. Thus,
it is possible that the decision maker may have to do infinite regress in a level-k
analysis. ME is an alternative solution concept which avoids that regress. In ME,
the decision maker believes that her opponent is modelling her actions in the same
way as she is modelling his actions. Both of them use their subjective distributions
over the probabilities and utilities of the opponent and seek an equilibrium. In
this Section, we consider two bidders, Brenda and Charles, and find ARA solutions
from Brenda’s perspective using a ME solution concept.
ARA for FPSB using ME solves the problem from Brenda’s perspective where
she believes that Charles will randomly draw the value of the item for Brenda
from a distribution which is different from his own distribution and it assumes
that the distributions are not commonly known (unlike in BNE) to both bidders.
So, Brenda does not know about Charles’s true value vC for the auctioned item and
his wealth wC and places distributions GBC on vC and HBC on wC . Likewise, she
believes that Charles also does not know about her true value vB for the auctioned
item and her wealth wB and believes that he places distributions GCB on vB and
HCB on wB.
Thus, Brenda would solve
max
b
{WB + (VB − b)aBGBC(vC(b))},
max
c
{WC + (VC − c)aCGCB(vB(c))},
(4.10)
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where b is Brenda’s bid that Charles might elicit, c is Brenda’s belief about
Charles’s bid, WB ∼ HCB is Brenda’s wealth that Charles might elicit, VB ∼ GCB
is Brenda’s true value that Charles might elicit, WC ∼ HBC is Brenda’s belief
about Charles’s wealth, VC ∼ GBC is Brenda’s belief about Charles’s true value,
aC is Brenda’s belief about Charles’s modified risk behavior parameter and aB is
Brenda’s modified risk-behavior parameter that Charles might elicit. In the case
wB > wC , aB could be found from (4.4) by allowing an abuse of notation in re-
placing i with B and j with C. If wB < wC , then it would be the other way round.








Figure 4.2: The BAID showing decision (rectangles), chance (circle) and utility
(hexagons) nodes for the ME solution concept for two bidders from Brenda’s perspec-
tive.
By taking the first derivative of each of the functions in (4.10) and equating to














where vC(b) = VC and vB(b) = VB are the inverse bid functions for Charles and
Brenda, respectively. Note that (4.11) is the special case of (4.8) with only two
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bidders but from an ARA perspective using the ME solution concept. Also, this
pair of ODEs has the same boundary conditions on the inverse bid functions as
given in (4.9). In general, no closed-form solution exists even for the pair of differ-
ential equations (4.11) and numerical methods are required to find the solutions.
In order to find equilibrium bid functions b(vB) and b(vC) from the pair of ODEs
(4.11), we use the shooting algorithm as described in Section 4.2.2. The solution
obtained from any numerical method would not be an exact solution and thus the
equilibrium bid functions obtained for Brenda and Charles are approximate equi-
librium bid functions denoted here by b̂(vB) and b̂(vC), respectively. As Brenda
is uncertain about Charles’s risk behavior, his wealth, his valuation and believes
that Charles is also uncertain in these quantities about her, she can use Monte
Carlo methods to take into account these uncertainties.
Example 4.1 Let Γ(v;κ, λ) be the truncated Gamma distribution on the interval
(30, 160] with parameters κ and λ. Suppose Brenda believes that Charles’s valu-
ation is a truncated Gamma distribution GBC(vC) = Γ(vC ; 5, 25) and she has the
belief that Charles believes that her valuation is a truncated Exponential distri-
bution GCB(vB) = Γ(vB; 1, 80). The auctioned item has a reserve price τ = 25
which is known in advance to both bidders. Suppose Brenda has a uniform dis-
tribution HBC = U [30, 170] on Charles’s wealth. Moreover, suppose that Brenda
believes that Charles might elicit her wealth as being uniformly distributed with
HCB = U [40, 200]. Figure 4.3 shows the assumed valuation distributions plot for
Brenda and Charles.
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Figure 4.3: Plot of assumed valuation distributions for Brenda and Charles
Firstly, we assume that Brenda believes that Charles is a risk-averse bidder and
she believes that Charles believes that she is also a risk-averse bidder. She believes
that they both draw their baseline risk-aversion parameters from the uniform distri-
bution UBC = UCB = U(0, 1). Assuming these distributions, she uses Monte Carlo
methods to take into account their risk-behavior, wealth, and valuation uncertain-
ties and performs N = 1000 simulations. The simulated approximate equilibrium
bid functions b̂(vB) and b̂(vC) with 95% probability (credible) intervals for Brenda
and Charles, respectively, are shown in Figure 4.4 for this case.
101







(a) Median and 95% probability interval for
Brenda’s approximate equilibrium bid function







(b) Median and 95% probability interval for
Charles’s approximate equilibrium bid function











(c) Median of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles











(d) Mean of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles
Figure 4.4: Approximate equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles with 95%
probability intervals when both are risk-averse bidders
Secondly, we assume that Brenda believes that Charles is a risk-seeking bidder
and she believes that Charles believes that she is also a risk-seeking bidder. She
believes that they both draw their baseline risk-seeking parameters from the uniform
distribution UBC = UCB = U(1, 2]. Assuming these distributions on their risk
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behavior, wealth and valuations, the results for N = 1000 simulations are shown
in Figure 4.5 for this case.








(a) Median and 95% probability interval for
Brenda’s approximate equilibrium bid function








(b) Median and 95% probability interval for
Charles’s approximate equilibrium bid function













(c) Median of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles













(d) Mean of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles
Figure 4.5: Approximate equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles with 95%
probability intervals when both are risk-seeking bidders
Thirdly, we assume that Brenda believes that Charles is a risk-seeking bidder
and she believes that Charles believes that she is a risk-averse bidder. She draws
Charles’s baseline risk seeking parameter from the uniform distribution UBC =
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U(1, 2] and she believes that Charles draws her baseline risk aversion parameter
from the uniform distribution UCB = U(0, 1). The results of Monte Carlo simula-
tions for this case are shown in Figure 4.6.










(a) Median and 95% probability interval for
Brenda’s approximate equilibrium bid function










(b) Median and 95% probability interval for
Charles’s approximate equilibrium bid function








(c) Median of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles








(d) Mean of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles
Figure 4.6: Approximate equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles with 95%
probability intervals when Brenda is a risk-averse bidder and Charles is a risk-seeking
bidder
Finally, we assume that Brenda believes that Charles is a risk-averse bidder
and she believes that Charles believes that she is a risk-seeking bidder. She draws
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Charles’s baseline risk aversion parameter from the uniform distribution UBC =
U(0, 1) and she believes that Charles draws her baseline risk seeking parameter from
the uniform distribution UCB = U(1, 2]. Figure 4.7 shows the results obtained from
Monte Carlo simulations for this case.
Note that in all four cases presented above, the plots of the probability intervals
converge to the lower boundary condition as the shooting algorithm has used this
as the ‘target’ for the system of ODEs given in (4.11). Whereas, these probability
intervals are apart at the upper boundary condition. This is because at this end, the
shooting algorithm yields different values of b̄ for the (different) simulated values
of wealth and modified risk behavior parameters. Overall, the simulation results
show that Brenda would most likely win the auction in the scenarios considered
except where she is a risk-seeking bidder and Charles is a risk-averse bidder (see
Figure 4.7).
Now, Brenda needs to find her optimal bid. For illustrative purposes, we con-
sider the first case which is shown in Figure 4.4 where both Brenda and Charles
are assumed to be risk-averse bidders. She could use the mode or the mean of
Charles’s valuation distribution as an estimate of his true value vC. Suppose she
decides to use the mode of Charles’s valuation distribution as an estimate of vC.
In our Example, she has a truncated Gamma distribution on Charles’s value with
κ = 5 and λ = 25. Thus, the mode of this distribution is (κ− 1)λ = 4× 25 = 100.
Now, suppose she uses the mean of the approximated equilibrium bid functions pre-
sented in Figure 4.4d to obtain an estimate of her optimal bid (alternatively, she
could use the median of the approximated equilibrium bid functions as presented in
Figure 4.4c). Thus, assuming that Brenda has her true value vB = 100, her ap-
proximate mean optimal bid is 78.24 against Charles’s approximate mean optimal
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bid of 70.20. Moreover, the data for Figure 4.4d shows that Brenda’s bid would be
a winning bid (that is, greater than 70.20) for all values of v = vB & 86.33.











(a) Median and 95% probability interval for
Brenda’s approximate equilibrium bid function











(b) Median and 95% probability interval for
Charles’s approximate equilibrium bid function









(c) Median of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles









(d) Mean of approximate equilibrium bid
functions for Brenda and Charles
Figure 4.7: Approximate equilibrium bid functions for Brenda and Charles with 95%
probability intervals when Brenda is a risk-seeking bidder and Charles is a risk-averse
bidder
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4.4 ARA for FPSB Auctions using BNE
In this section, we develop ARA solutions from Brenda’s perspective where she
assumes that the other bidders use a BNE to find their optimal bids. There are
the symmetric and asymmetric cases to consider.
4.4.1 Symmetric Case
From a Bayesian game-theoretic perspective, the symmetric case with n bidders has
the assumption that bidders draw their valuations independently from a common
distribution G that is known to all the bidders and who are aware that each bidder
knows G. This is the strong common knowledge assumption.
Here, we derive an ARA solution from the ith bidder’s perspective assuming n
bidders when she believes that all of her opponents will solve the problem using
a symmetric BNE approach. For consistency and simplicity, we assume that the
ith bidder is Brenda and she assumes that all of the other (n − 1) bidders will
draw their true values from the distribution G with support (v, v̄] such that v ≥ τ ,
where τ is the reserve price for the item. Note that here, unlike in BNE, we do not
assume that Brenda and her (n− 1) opponents know the common distribution G.
Moreover, we take into account bidders’ wealth where Brenda believes that all of
her rivals draw their wealth from a distribution H with support (w, w̄] such that
w ≥ v. We assume that Brenda being the ith bidder has true value vi, modified
risk behavior parameter ai as defined in (4.4) and wealth wi for the item and
consequently bids b(vi). For simplicity, we relabel wi to w, ai to a, vi to v and
thus b(vi) to b(v).
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Now, using the modified risk behavior parameter (4.4) and the utility function
(4.2), we find the equilibrium bid function b(v). Thus, Brenda’s expected utility
having bid function b(v) would be
[w + {v − b(v)}a]Pr[Brenda wins] + wPr[Brenda loses].
Since the bidding function b(v) is a strictly increasing function of v, then b(v)
would be the winning bid if and only if all other (n − 1) bidders bid b(vs) < b(v)
for s = 1, . . . , n, s 6= i. Now, as each bidder independently draws their value,
the ith bidder will win with probability G(v)n−1 So, Brenda’s expected utility by
bidding b(v) would be
[w + {v − b(v)}a]G(v)n−1 + w[1−G(v)n−1],
which simplifies to
w + [v − b(v)]aG(v)n−1. (4.12)
For all the other (n − 1) bidders with their own wealth, own modified risk
behavior parameters and own true values, the expression (4.12) would hold. The
equilibrium bid would be b(v) and could be found by solving
max
x
{w + [v − b(x)]aG(x)n−1},
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This is a first order linear differential equation. Using the integrating factor method














By using integration by parts, this expression may be simplified to









In general, the integral in this expression needs to be approximated numerically.
Note that Equation (4.13) based on the utility function (4.2) turns out to be the
same as given by Josheski (2017) and others based on the utility function (4.1).
However, in (4.13), we have incorporated the effect of bidders’ wealth on their
bidding behavior in the form of a modified risk behavior parameter as defined in
(4.4) rather than just the baseline risk behavior parameter which has been used by
Josheski (2017) and others. Also, they consider risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders
in their model. Whereas, we model these auctions not only for risk-neutral and
risk-averse bidders but also for risk-seeking bidders.
Now, suppose that each bidder draws her/his value v from a uniform distribu-




av + (n− 1)v
n− 1 + a
. (4.14)
Let W ∗ be the highest wealth among the other (n−1) bidders. If Brenda’s wealth
w = wi was such that w > W ∗, then her value of a = ai would follow from (4.4)
with 0 < h = W ∗/w < 1. On the other hand, if w ≤ W ∗, then a = r, her baseline
risk behavior parameter. To obtain W ∗, Brenda could, for example, use the mean
of the highest order statistic of H of the other (n− 1) bidders.
Example 4.2 Suppose that the value each bidder holds is an independent draw
from the uniform distribution G(v) = v−30
170
with support (30, 200] and the auctioned
item has reserve price τ = 30. It is also assumed that each bidder draws other
bidders’ wealth from the uniform distribution H(x) = x−50
200
with support [50, 250].
Assuming that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-neutral; i.e., a = 1, Equation
(4.14) becomes
b(v) =
30 + (n− 1)v
n
,
which is an increasing function of v and n.
Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-averse. We take
two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W ∗ and in the second case, we
assume that w ≤ W ∗.
1. Suppose Brenda finds the highest wealth W ∗ among the other (n− 1) bidders
by using order statistics. It is well-known that if there are m iid continuous
random variables X1, . . . , Xm with a common probability density function q
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and corresponding distribution function Q, then the probability density of the
mth order statistic X(m) is given by mqQm−1. In the case when q has a
uniform distribution on [α, β], the probability density of X(m) is given by
m(x− α)m−1
(β − α)m
, α ≤ x ≤ β.













. Recalling that the other bidders’ wealth
are distributed as a uniform distribution on [50, 250], then substituting β =
250, α = 50, and m = n− 1 into this last equation yields
W ∗ =





We find Brenda’s optimal bids for the choices n = 2, 5 and 10. For these
values of n, Brenda would have W ∗ = 150, 210, and 230, respectively. Let
Brenda have wealth w = 250; i.e., w > W ∗. In this case, her modified risk-




W∗ and r is assumed to take any
value in the interval (0, 1).
2. Let Brenda have wealth w = 150 whereas W ∗ = 150, 210, 230 for n = 2, 5, 10,
respectively, as we assumed above. Thus, w ≤ W ∗ and her modified risk-
aversion parameter would be a = r in this case.
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n− 1 + a
. (4.15)
Figure 4.8 shows the plots of Brenda’s bid function for different values of n where
all bidders are risk-averse and her true value v = 150. The upper curve in each plot
shows how Brenda’s bid function changes at different risk-aversion levels for the
first case; i.e., w > W ∗ while the lower curve shows how her bid function changes
at different risk-aversion levels for the second case; i.e., w ≤ W ∗. It shows that
being wealthier than the other (n−1) bidders, she would bid more aggressively and
could have a greater chance to win the auctioned item. It also shows that with
increase in n, Brenda would expect an increase in W ∗ and consequently her bid
would increase.
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w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
0.021 0.068 0.134 0.216 0.314 0.426 0.551 0.689 0.839
a = r1.67
(a) n = 2,W ∗ = 150














w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
0.065 0.147 0.239 0.336 0.438 0.545 0.654 0.767 0.882
a = r1.19
(b) n = 5,W ∗ = 210










w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
0.081 0.173 0.269 0.368 0.47 0.573 0.678 0.784 0.892
a = r1.09
(c) n = 10,W ∗ = 230
Figure 4.8: Brenda’s optimal bids for different values of n and a when she and other
bidders are risk-averse
Now, we assume that Brenda and all other bidders are risk-seeking and again take
those two cases. In the first case, we assume that w > W ∗ and in the second case,
we assume that w ≤ W ∗.
1. Let Brenda have wealth w = 250 so that as before, w > W ∗ for n = 2, 5
and 10. Thus, in this case, her modified risk-seeking parameter would be
a = rh = r
W∗
w and r is her baseline risk-seeking parameter that can take any
value in the interval (1, 2] that she believes.
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2. Let Brenda have wealth w = 150 so that w ≤ W ∗. Thus, her modified risk-
seeking parameter in this case would be a = r.
For these two cases, we would again have (4.15) with an appropriate choice of a as
explained above. Figure 4.9 shows the plots of Brenda’s bid function for different
values of n where all bidders are risk-seeking and her true value v = 150. The
upper curve in each plot shows how Brenda’s bid function changes at different
risk-seeking levels for the first case; i.e., w > W ∗ while the lower curve shows how
her bid function changes at different risk-seeking levels for the second case; i.e.,
w ≤ W ∗. It shows that being wealthier than the other (n − 1) bidders, she could
be less risk-seeking, could bid higher than the other bidders and so could have a
greater chance to win the auctioned item. It also shows that with increase in n,
Brenda would expect an increase in W ∗ and consequently her bid would increase.
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w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
1.059 1.116 1.17 1.224 1.275 1.326 1.375 1.423 1.47
a = r0.60
(a) n = 2,W ∗ = 150












w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
1.083 1.165 1.247 1.327 1.406 1.484 1.562 1.638 1.715
a = r0.84
(b) n = 5,W ∗ = 210














w > W ∗
w ≤W ∗
1.092 1.183 1.273 1.363 1.452 1.541 1.629 1.717 1.805
a = r0.92
(c) n = 10,W ∗ = 230
Figure 4.9: Brenda’s optimal bids for different values of n and a when she and other
bidders are risk-seeking
4.4.2 Asymmetric Case
From a BNE perspective, an asymmetric case has the assumption that the bidders
draw their valuations for the item from different distributions and that all of these
distributions are commonly known to each bidder.
Here, we derive an ARA solution from Brenda’s perspective for a 2-player game
where, she assumes that Charles will solve his problem using an asymmetric BNE
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perspective. Brenda thinks that Charles’s true value vC has a distribution GBC
and his wealth wC has a distribution HBC . Also, Brenda believes that Charles
might elicit that her true value vB has a distribution GCB and her wealth wB has
a distribution HCB. As neither knows the true value and wealth of their oppo-




{WB + (VB − b)aBGBC(vC(b))},
max
c
{WC + (VC − c)aCGCB(vB(c))},
(4.16)
where b is Brenda’s bid that Charles might elicit, c is Brenda’s belief about
Charles’s bid, aC is Brenda’s belief about Charles’s modified risk behavior pa-
rameter and aB is Brenda’s modified risk-behavior parameter that Charles might
elicit. These values of aB and aC will depend on whether wB > wC or wB ≤ wC
(see (4.4) and the text following).
Note that (4.16) turns out to be the same as (4.10) and therefore, its ARA solution
is the same as that derived for the ME solution concept in Section 4.3. Thus, for
two bidders, the ARA solutions for the BNE asymmetric case and ME turn out
to be the same, but of course the assumptions made are different. When there are
more than two bidders, the ARA perspective opens a larger class of equilibrium
problems. We discuss this further in Section 4.5.
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4.5 Discussion and Further Work
In this chapter, we provide a more realistic approach to modelling FPSB auctions
than what has previously been done. We assume that the auctioned item is normal
which is typically the nature of many items sold using these auctions. We extend
Banks et al. (2015) and Ejaz et al. (2021) by developing ARA solutions for ME
and BNE solution concepts, where we take into account uncertainties such as
bidders’ wealth and their heterogeneous risk behavior (risk-neutral, risk-averse or
risk-seeking).
We provide a general framework on how to find ARA solutions assuming n
bidders for the BNE solution concept for the symmetric case, as well as for the
ME solution concept when there are two bidders. We show that the ARA solutions
for the BNE solution concept with two bidders for the asymmetric case turn out to
be the same as the ARA solutions derived for the ME solution concept. We provide
numerical examples to illustrate ME and the BNE solutions for the symmetric case.
To take into account uncertainties such as bidders’ wealth and heterogeneous risk
behavior, we use a Monte Carlo method to find ME solutions under different
scenarios of bidders’ risk behavior. The bidding behavior of bidders has been
illustrated by approximate equilibrium bid functions along with 95% probability
intervals. The results show that the bidder having more wealth is more risk-
averse (less risk-seeking) and thus bids more aggressively than the bidder having
less wealth. Similar results have been found for the BNE symmetric case. Thus,
for the normal items, it shows that a bidder would typically bid higher with an
increase in her relative wealth. This is consistent with the definition of normal
items.
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Finding the ARA solution for the ME solution concept for n ≥ 3 bidders could
be quite challenging. The decision maker needs to model not only what she be-
lieves are the valuation distributions of other bidders, but also what she thinks
are the valuation distributions each bidder has for the other bidders. She would
have to solve the problem from each of her opponents’ perspectives and thus would
get the optimal strategy for each of them. Then, from the distribution of optimal
strategies of her opponents, she can find her own optimal strategy.
Also, if the decision maker is uncertain about the solution concept that her adver-
saries are going to use, she needs to incorporate concept (model) uncertainty into
her solutions. This could be done as follows. She first finds the optimal solution
E(b∗|M) conditional on the given modelM (non-strategic play, level-k thinking,
BNE, ME etc.) she wants to consider. Then she has to elicit a probability distri-
bution p(M) that reflects her uncertainty onM. The optimal solution taking into





Moreover, the practical challenge in adopting a Bayesian approach is elicitation of
prior distributions. Ríos Insua et al. (2016) highlight the significance and provide
an outline for the robustness analysis for ARA. The sensitivity of the optimal so-
lution to any errors or mis-specifications in the utilities and probabilities elicited
for the analysis is important to investigate but has yet to be developed in an ARA
framework.
Finally, ARA solutions are specific to the choice of the utility function. Here, we
have illustrated how ARA solutions can be developed for a utility function (4.2)
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which is considered to be more realistic than other CRRA utility functions previ-
ously proposed. However, there are other utility functions such as, for instance,
the one used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) which takes into account
winning and losing regrets, that could be more appropriate for a given problem.
ARA solutions for these other utility functions will also need to be found as neces-
sary. Importantly, sensitivity of the ARA solutions to the choice of utility function
should be studied too.
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Chapter 5
Adversarial Risk Analysis for
Auctions using Non-Strategic Play
and Level-k Thinking: A General
Case of n Bidders with Regret
In this chapter, we apply an adversarial risk analysis approach for first-price sealed-
bid auctions and find solutions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking solu-
tion concepts assuming n bidders. We define new regret parameters and a modified
utility function to incorporate the effect of bidders’ wealth on their bidding be-
havior. In our modelling, we assume that the auctioned item is a normal item and




5.1.1 Models for First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Considerable progress has been made during the past half century in modelling of
various auctions formats and the bidders’ behaviors. First-price sealed-bid (FPSB)
auctions1 are one of the commonly used auction formats. Bidders’ behaviors for
FPSB auctions have commonly been modelled using the decision-theoretic and
Bayesian game-theoretic approaches. Using a decision-theoretic approach, the de-
cision maker believes that all other bidders are non-strategic and finds their optimal
bid by placing subjective distributions on each of the other bidders’ valuations for
the auctioned item. It has been argued that the bidders use decision-theoretic
models for auctions since they typically assess the probability distribution of the
best competitive bid and then optimize their decision about the bid against that
assessed probability distribution (see e.g. Capen et al., 1971; Keefer et al., 1991;
Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994; Rothkopf, 2007; Wang and Guo, 2017, among oth-
ers). However, decision theory models non-strategic adversaries, whereas bidders
can often be strategic. A Bayesian game-theoretic model on the other hand, models
bidders to be strategic adversaries. In this model, bidders draw their valuations for
the auctioned item from a distribution that is considered to be commonly known
to all bidders and find their optimal bids using a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE)
bidding strategy. Vickrey (1961) made a significant breakthrough in understanding
bidders’ behaviors using a Bayesian game-theoretic model. Further work using a
Bayesian game-theoretic approach includes Criesmer et al. (1967); Wilson (1969);
1In FPSB auctions, bidders submit their bids in sealed envelopes to the auctioneer. Those
envelopes are then opened and the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the
amount equal to the bid.
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Riley and Samuelson (1981); Cox et al. (1982b,a); Maskin and Riley (1984, 2000);
Campo et al. (2011); Gentry et al. (2015); Li and Tan (2017) among others. The
assumptions of “non-strategic opponents" in decision theory and of the “common
knowledge" in Bayesian game theory make these two approaches unrealistic in
practical situations in which the opponents may be strategic and may wish to
keep their bidding distribution a secret to gain competitive advantage. See Joshi
et al. (2020) for further discussion on the limitations of a Bayesian game theoretic
approach including on games with incomplete information.
Ríos Insua et al. (2009) introduced an approach called adversarial risk analysis
(ARA) that is considered to be more realistic to model real life situations involv-
ing strategic adversaries than the traditional decision theory and game theoretic
approaches. While ARA allows the decision maker to model strategic opponents
as in game theory, it models the problem from the decision maker’s point of view
alone, thus eliminating the need to assume distributions that are commonly known
by all players. ARA is a Bayesian approach because the decision maker uses her
subjective distributions to model the unknown preferences, capabilities and beliefs
of her strategic opponents. However, unlike game theory, these subjective distri-
butions do not need to be commonly known to all players. Also, ARA allows the
decision maker to model how her intelligent adversaries frame the problem which
includes different solution concepts such as non-strategic play, level-k thinking,
mirror equilibrium (ME) or indeed the BNE. While using a non-strategic play so-
lution concept, the decision maker models their rivals to be non-strategic - whose
bids are independent of their rivals’ bids; when using a BNE solution concept,
the decision maker believes that their adversaries will use a BNE strategy to find
their optimal bids. In a level-k thinking solution concept, the decision maker being
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a level-k thinker believes that her rivals are level-(k − 1) thinkers and each level-
(k−1) thinker believes that her/his rivals are level-(k−2) thinkers and so on. Thus,
the decision maker always thinks one level higher than her rivals in this solution
concept. While using a ME solution concept, the decision maker believes that her
rivals are modelling their opponents’ (including the decision maker’s) actions in the
same way as she is modelling their actions. All use their subjective distributions
over the probabilities and utilities of their rivals and seek an equilibrium.
Banks et al. (2015) modelled FPSB auctions assuming that each bidder is
risk-neutral and found ARA solutions for non-strategic play, minimax perspective,
level-k thinking, ME and BNE solution concepts. Ejaz et al. (2021a) or Chapter 3
extended this work by using a more realistic utility function for these auctions and
assuming that the bidders have different risk behaviors and different wealth. They
derived ARA solutions using non-strategic play and the level-k thinking solution
concepts assuming two bidders. Then, Ejaz et al. (2021b) or Chapter 4 modelled
these auctions using ME and BNE solution concepts under ARA framework where
they assumed n bidders, all of whom have different risk behaviors and different
wealth.
In all of these models, bidders’ bidding behavior is determined using a utility
function that depends only upon each bidder’s profit. However, there may be
other potentially important components than profit such as institutional frame-
work (Fox and Tversky, 1998), misperception of probabilities of winning (Dorsey
and Razzolini, 2003) and bidders’ regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989; Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok, 2007) etc., that affect bidders’ bidding behavior.
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5.1.2 Utility Functions for FPSB Auctions
In FPSB auctions, suppose that the bidders are risk-neutral who draw their values
independently and privately. Then, a bidding strategy that is found using a game-
theoretic approach is known as a risk-neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) bidding
strategy (see Vickrey, 1961). The FPSB auctions have extensively been analysed
using experimental techniques. A consistent outcome found in the experiments is
that bidders consistently bid above the RNNE bidding strategy (see e.g., Dorsey
and Razzolini, 2003; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1989; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Ka-
tok, 2007, among others). Different types of explanations such as risk-aversion,
interpersonal interaction, learning direction, and regret etc. have been given in
economic literature for this overbidding behavior of the bidders.
Risk aversion is relevant to take into account in FPSB auctions as one explanation
of bidders’ overbidding behavior (see e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Maskin and
Riley, 1984; Cox et al., 1988; Gentry et al., 2015, among others). In such modelling,
a constant relative risk-averse (CRRA) utility function is the most commonly used
function (Holt and Laury, 2002). A CRRA utility function for the ith bidder hav-
ing wealth wi is typically defined as
ui(bi, vi, wi) =

(wi + vi − bi)ri , if she wins the bid,
wrii , if she loses the bid,
(5.1)
where, (1− ri) is the coefficient of CRRA, vi is the ith bidder’s true value for the
auctioned item and bi is her amount of bid. However, it has been shown (Ejaz
et al., 2021a, or Chapter 3) that the utility function (5.1) is unrealistic because it
can yield a positive utility even when the bidder does not have the ability to buy
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the auctioned item. Ejaz et al. (2021a) or Chapter 3 assumed that the auctioned
item is normal2 and defined a new utility function for the ith bidder participating
in FPSB auctions as
u(bi, vi, wi) =

wi + (vi − bi)ai , if she wins the bid,
wi, if she loses the bid,
(5.2)
where ai is a modified CRRA parameter that changes with the relative change in
circumstances of the bidders’ wealth. However, Kagel (1995, p. 525) suggested
that risk aversion may not be the only factor that generates bidding above the
RNNE in FPSB auctions. Inter-personal interactions and comparisons is another
explanation of bidders’ overbidding behavior in FPSB auctions (see e.g., Isaac and
Walker, 1985; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2002; Morgan et al., 2003). Another ex-
planation of this overbidding behavior is using learning direction theory proposed
by Selten and Stoecker (1986). Based on feedback over time this theory leads to
the direction in which the bids are likely to be adjusted. Neugebauer and Selten
(2006) found that most of the bidders adjust their bids in the same way as that of
learning direction theory. However, this theory does not give any explanation for
bidders’ initial overbidding.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) gave another possible explanation of bidders’ over-
bidding behavior and modelled their utility by a linear combination of their profit
and two types of regret. They stated that in FPSB auctions, the winner pays
more than the second highest bid and therefore could realize a winning regret by
2An item with positive income elasticity is defined as a normal item in economic theory, i.e.,
the demand for a normal item rises with an increase in income and falls with a decrease in income
(see, e.g., Fisher, 1990; Goeree et al., 2002; Piros and Pinto, 2013; Perloff, 2015; Baisa, 2017, for
more details)
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paying much more than the second highest bid. On the other hand, some winner’s
bid could be less than that of the losing bidder’s valuation (willingness to pay).
Thus, in this case the loser could regret bidding too low because she has missed an
opportunity to win the item at a favourable price. So, the bidder could not only
be sensitive to her expected profit but also to the expected amount of her winning
and losing regret when deciding on her bid amount. The weight on each type
of regret potentially determines her bidding behavior. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2007) modelled the ith bidder’s bidding behavior by taking into account
her winning and losing regrets while assuming that she has a risk-neutral utility.







[ζi + ηi(bi − bj)]fij(bj|bj ≤ bi)dbj, if she wins the bid,
−
∫
bj :bi<bj≤vi [ϑi + θi(vi − bj)]fij(bj|bj > bi)dbj, if she loses the bid,
(5.3)
where bj is the jth bidder’s bid and is the maximum of the bids from the ith bid-
der’s (n−1) opponents and fij(bj) is the probability distribution on bj that the ith
bidder believes. Also, bi − bj is the excess amount of money paid if the ith bidder
wins and her utility suffers by an amount ζi + ηi(bi − bj) where ηi ≥ 0. Larger
values of ηi means a higher winning regret for the ith bidder. Negative values of
ζi allows some pleasure to the ith bidder in case of winning. On the other hand, if
the ith bidder loses and the highest bid satisfies the inequality bi ≤ bj ≤ vi, then
the ith bidder misses an opportunity to win at a favourable price and her utility
suffers by an amount ϑi + θi(vi − bj), where ϑi, θi ≥ 0.
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However, the model proposed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) does have
a few limitations. Firstly, the utility function (5.3) does not take into account the
bidder’s wealth and therefore assumes that all bidders have zero wealth, that is
wi = 0, ∀i. It is unrealistic to assume that the ith bidder can place their optimal
bid b∗i > 0 found using this utility function with zero wealth. In fact, consid-
ering bidders’ wealth is a significant determinant of bidders’ bidding behavior in
these auctions (see e.g., Gentry et al., 2015; Ejaz et al., 2021a, among others).
Secondly, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) found their optimal bid using a
decision theoretic approach, the limitations of which have been discussed above.
ARA solutions for FPSB auctions using a utility function that takes into account
the winning and losing regret have not been found yet. Since this type of utility
function contains integrals whose limits vary with change of decision maker’s op-
ponent valuation at each draw, therefore, it turns out that finding ARA solutions
for such a type of utility function is methodologically and computationally more
challenging than finding ARA solutions using a utility function such as the one
given in (5.2).
5.1.3 Contributions in this Chapter
The main contributions contained in this Chapter are as follows:
• We modify the utility function (5.3) used by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2007) wherein,
• we consider the wealth of each bidder and assume that a bidder can
only bid an amount less than or equal to their wealth,
• we assume that the bidders may have different wealth,
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• we assume that the auctioned item is normal and define new winning
and losing regret parameters to incorporate the effect of increase in
wealth on bidders’ bidding behavior,
• we assumed that the auctioned item has a reserve price (typically,
known to each bidder in advance).
• We find ARA solutions for non-strategic play and level-k thinking solution
concepts using the modified utility function.
5.1.4 Structure of the Chapter
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we define new
regret parameters and the modified utility function. In Section 5.3, we derive
ARA solutions using the non-strategic play solution concept assuming n bidders
participating in a FPSB auction. In Section 5.4, we derive ARA solutions using
the level-k thinking solution concept. Finally, in Section 5.5, we discuss the results
obtained in this Chapter and present some ideas for future work.
5.2 New Regret Parameters and Modified Utility
Function
The winning regret parameters ζi and ηi in (5.3) yield a linear function where ζi is
allowed to take both the negative and positive values and ηi ≥ 0. Positive values of
ζi result in an increase in bidder’s winning regret and consequently her bid would
decrease. Whereas, with the negative values of ζi, the bidder can realize some
pleasure from winning. But, with sufficiently negative values of ζi, the bidder could
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bid in excess of her true value. On the other hand, the losing regret parameters
ϑi and θi also yield a linear function where ϑi, θi ≥ 0. The greater the values of
ϑi and θi, the more the losing regret to the bidder and as a result she would bid
higher.
Since in equilibrium, bidders never bid above their true values (Gentry et al.,
2015), we make a realistic assumption that the ith bidder will bid bi such that
bi ≤ vi ≤ wi. Therefore, we do not allow negative values of ζi because negative
values can result in the ith bidder bidding more than her true value. Also, with an
increase in positive values of ζi, the ith bidder’s winning regret increases which can
be modelled by having larger values of ηi only in the utility function. Therefore,
we model the ith bidder’s winning regret only with ηi and set ζi = 0. Similarly,
the ith bidder’s losing regret can be modelled by having just θi and therefore, we
set ϑi = 0.
When the auctioned item is normal, bidders’ winning and losing regret could
change with the relative change in the circumstances of their wealth. For the ith
bidder, suppose her original winning and losing regret parameters are ηi and θi, re-
spectively. These are fixed and we call them her baseline regret parameters. Note
that ηi and θi are the same as defined in (5.3). The relative change in circum-
stances could occur in two possible cases; firstly, when a bidder’s wealth changes
and secondly, when a bidder attempts to model the winning and losing regrets of
her rivals.
Firstly, we model the ith bidder’s regret at an increased level of her wealth com-
pared with her original level of wealth and thus modify her regret parameters. As
mentioned above, ηi is the ith bidder’s baseline winning regret parameter and θi is
her baseline losing regret parameter, which represent her natural regret appetite
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at her wealth, say wi(1). Lets assume that the circumstances of the ith bidder
change (e.g., she gains an inheritance) and her wealth is increased to wi(2). At this
increased wealth level, we expect an increase in her losing regret and a decrease in
her winning regret for the same auctioned item (since the item is assumed to be
a normal item). So, we modify her winning regret parameter having wealth wi(2)
relative to wealth wi(1) as
η̂i = h× ηi, ηi > 0, (5.4)





× θi, θi > 0, (5.5)
where, we define 0 < h = wi(1)/wi(2) ≤ 1. Note that when h = 1, that means no
change in the ith bidder’s wealth and thus she would have η̂i = ηi and θ̂i = θi.
Secondly, when the ith bidder is bidding against her (n−1) rivals in FPSB auctions
and believes that she is the wealthiest among all n bidders, then she would have
more losing regret and less winning regret compared to her baseline. Suppose that
wi is the wealth of the ith bidder and wj is the wealth of the jth bidder who
the ith bidder believes is the wealthiest among the other (n − 1) bidders. Thus,
for wi > wj, we modify the ith bidder’s winning and losing regret by using (5.4)
and (5.5), respectively, where 0 < h = wj/wi ≤ 1. In this case, she would model
the other (n− 1) bidders’ (including the jth bidder’s) modified regret parameters
as being equal to their baseline regret parameters, i.e., η̂s = ηs and θ̂s = θs
for s = 1, 2, . . . , n, s 6= i. In contrast, if the ith bidder believes that the jth
bidder is the wealthiest bidder among all n bidders, she can find the jth bidder’s
modified regret parameters from (5.4) and (5.5) by replacing i with j and taking
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0 < h = wi/wj ≤ 1. In this case, we assume that she would model the regret
parameters of the other (n − 1) bidders (including herself) as being unchanged,
i.e., η̂s = ηs and θ̂s = θs for s = 1, 2, . . . , n, s 6= j.
In the utility function (5.3), (vi − bj) yields the opportunity loss by the ith
bidder at a favourable price if she loses, i.e., the extent of the difference between
her true value vi for the item and the winning bid bj if bi < bj ≤ vi. However,
the ith bidder could have regret on just the extent of the difference between her
losing bid bi and the winning bid bj, i.e., (bj − bi) provided that bi < bj ≤ vi which
is what tends to happen in practice. Thus, using (5.4) and (5.5), we define our
modified utility function for the ith bidder as
ui(bi, vi, wi) =

(wi + vi − bi)−
∫
bj :bj≤bi η̂i(bi − bj)fij(bj|bj ≤ bi)dbj, if she wins the bid,
wi −
∫
bj :bi<bj≤vi θ̂i(bj − bi)fij(bj|bj > bi)dbj, if she loses the bid,
(5.6)
where the effect of bidders’ wealth has been incorporated in the form of modified
regret parameters in (5.6) which has not been encountered yet for such type of
utility function.
5.3 Non-Strategic Play
In this section, we assume n bidders and find ARA solutions for one of the bidders
named Brenda. Using a non-strategic play solution concept, Brenda believes that
all the other (n − 1) bidders are non-strategic, i.e., their analyses do not depend
upon the situation of Brenda and the other bidders. We assume that each of
Brenda’s opponents will bid an amount that is independent of her bid. We assume
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that Brenda is the first bidder among n bidders and she bids an amount b1, having
wealth w1 and true value v1 for the auctioned item. We assume that the auctioned
item has a reserve price τ such that τ < b1 ≤ v1 ≤ w1 and it is a normal item.
Brenda believes that the other (n−1) bidders have wealthWi for i = 2, . . . , n that
are unknown to her and therefore, she places the distributions H1i with support
[wi, w̄i] on their wealth according to her belief such that wi > τ , i = 2, . . . , n. She
also does not know about their true values Vi and their bids Bi for the auctioned
item. Therefore, she places distributions G1i with support [vi, v̄i] on their true
values according to her belief such that τ < vi ≤ wi, v̄i ≤ w̄i, i = 2, . . . , n. Then
she finds the distributions F1i (defined in Equation (5.8) later in this section) of
their bids with support [bi, b̄i] such that τ < bi ≤ vi and b̄i ≤ v̄i. Assuming that
the bids are continuous, Brenda can find her probability of winning from a bid of
amount b1 against the ith bidder as
F1i(b1) = Pr(Bi < b1), i = 2, . . . , n,
where, F1i is the distribution over the ith bidder’s bid that Brenda believes. To
obtain F1i, Brenda divides her introspection into two parts as G1i, the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) that quantifies her uncertainty for the ith bidder’s
true value and T1i, the CDF that quantifies her uncertainty for the fraction of the
true value pi = bi/vi that the ith bidder bids, where bi and vi are the respective bids
and true values of the ith bidder, i = 2, . . . , n. The support for T1i is (vi/vi, 1]. She
can then derive her subjective distribution function over Bi = PiVi, the amount of
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the ith bidder’s random bid, as















t1i(pi)dpi = 1, the above equation simplifies to




where, g1i(vi) is the probability density function for the ith bidder’s true value
that Brenda elicits and t1i(pi) is the probability density function for the fraction
of the ith bidder’s true value that Brenda believes he will bid. Equation (5.7)
assumes that the ith bidder’s true value Vi and fraction of his true value Pi are
independent.
Now, based upon the assumption that the bidder having more wealth tends to
bid higher than the bidder having less wealth when the auctioned item is normal,
Brenda believes that the jth bidder having the highest wealth wj among her (n−1)
opponents will bid bj which is the maximum bid among the other (n− 1) bidders.
So, Brenda will consider the jth bidder as her competitor bidder. Thus, using
(5.4), (5.5) and (5.6), Brenda’s expected utility is
Ψ1(b1) =
[
(w1 + v1 − b1)−
∫
bj :vj<bj≤b1












where F1j is the probability distribution on bj that Brenda believes which can be
found by using (5.8) and η̂1 and θ̂1 are her modified winning and losing regret
parameters, respectively. As, f1j(bj|bj ≤ b1) = f1j(bj)/F1j(b1) and f1j(bj|bj >
b1) = f1j(bj)/[1− F1j(b1)], the above equation simplifies to








Finally, Brenda can find her optimal bid b∗1 by solving the following
b∗1 = arg max
vj<b1≤v1









In fact, b∗1 is a function of η̂i and θ̂i and therefore, a function of ηi, θi and wj. As ηi
and θi are Brenda’s fixed baseline regret parameters, we can treat b∗1 as a function
of wj and so re-write (5.9) as
b∗1(wj) = arg max
b1>τ









Brenda can use (5.10) to find her optimal bid by taking into account her uncertainty





where H1j is the distribution on wj that Brenda believes. Numerical methods may
often be needed to solve (5.11) for E(b∗1).
Example 5.1 Suppose Brenda is bidding against her opponents Alex and Charles.
Brenda believes that Alex and Charles are non-strategic bidders. Let Brenda, Alex
and Charles be the first, second and the third bidders, respectively. Let Brenda’s
true value for the item be v1 = $200 and the auctioned item have a reserve price
τ = $25. Also,
• Brenda has a uniform distribution on Alex’s true value with v2 = $30, v̄2 =
$200, i.e., G12 = (v2−30)200−30 .
• Brenda has a uniform distribution on Alex’s wealth with w2 = $100, w̄2 =
$250, i.e., H12 = (w2−100)250−100 .
• Brenda has a uniform distribution on Charles’s true value with v3 = $30, v̄3 =
$250, i.e., G13 = (v3−30)250−30 .
• Brenda has a uniform distribution on Charles’s wealth with w3 = $150, w̄3 =
$300, i.e., H13 = (w3−150)300−150 .
• Brenda elicit her uncertainties around the fraction of her opponents true
values that they would bid as T1i =
p8i−(vi/vi)8
1−(vi/vi)8
with support (vi/vi < pi ≤ 1]
for i = 2, 3.
First, for the sake of illustration and simplicity, we assume that Brenda chooses
Alex and Charles’s wealth to be w2 = $170 and w3 = $210, respectively, according
to her belief. Thus, she would believe Charles as her competitor as he has more
wealth than Alex and will find her optimal bid against him. Thus, using (5.8)
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We assume that Brenda’s baseline winning and losing regret parameters are η1 and
θ1, respectively, and suppose that her wealth is w1 = $200. As her wealth w1 = $200
is less than that of Charles’ wealth of w3 = $210, we take η̂1 = η1 and θ̂1 = θ1 as
defined in Section 5.2. Table 5.1 shows Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of
winning and her expected utilities for various assumed levels of her winning and
losing regret parameters for this case.
Now, we assume Brenda’s wealth increases to w1 = $250, while Charles’s wealth
is unchanged at w3 = $210. In this case, we expect her to have more losing regret
and less winning regret than Charles because she is able (since the item is normal)
to pay more to increase her chance of winning the bid. By using (5.4), we model
Brenda’s reduced winning regret when w1 = $250 relative to w3 = $210 as η̂1 =
h× η1 = (210/250)× η1 = 0.84η1. Her increased losing regret is modelled by using
(5.5) when w1 = $250 relative to w3 = $210 as θ̂1 = (1/h)× θ1 = (250/210)× θ1 =
1.19θ1. Table 5.2 shows how Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of winning
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Table 5.1: Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of winning and expected utilities when
w1 = $200 and w3 = $210.
η̂1 = η1 θ̂1 = θ1 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
b∗1 108.98 119.12 133.23 142.81 149.84
0.50 F (b∗1) 0.43 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.62
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 222.35 215.66 206.13 199.60 194.80
b∗1 97.39 107.63 122.34 132.57 140.21
1.00 F (b∗1) 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.54 0.58
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 214.78 205.93 192.92 183.70 176.77
b∗1 81.75 91.49 106.24 117.00 125.27
2.00 F (b∗1) 0.29 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.51
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 204.63 192.26 173.13 158.89 147.80
b∗1 71.73 80.68 94.82 105.54 114.00
3.00 F (b∗1) 0.24 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.45
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 198.18 183.14 159.01 140.37 125.44
b∗1 64.77 72.94 86.26 96.68 105.11
4.00 F (b∗1) 0.20 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.41
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 193.73 176.65 148.44 125.99 107.62
and her expected utilities change with change in η1 and θ1 for this case. In general,
it shows that an increase in losing regret leads Brenda to a higher optimum bid,
resulting in a higher probability of winning at that bid, but with a lower expected
utility. Whereas, an increase in winning regret leads Brenda to a lower optimum
bid, resulting in a lower probability of winning at that bid, and a lower expected
utility.
However, in practice, Brenda may instead be uncertain about w2 and w3, Alex
and Charles’s wealth, respectively, and thus would have to take into account her
uncertainty around w2 and w3. Under such a situation, she can elicit H12 and H13,
the distributions on Alex and Charles’s wealth, respectively. In this case, she can
use the expected value of her opponents’ wealth as an estimate to find the wealth-
iest bidder among her opponents. Thus, max{E(W2),E(W3)} = max{175, 225} =
225 = E(W3). So, Brenda would believe Charles (the 3rd bidder) is her competitor
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Table 5.2: Brenda’s optimal bids, her probabilities of winning and expected utilities when
w1 = $250 and w3 = $210.
θ1 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
η1 η̂1 θ̂1 0.60 1.19 2.38 3.57 4.76
b∗1 113.34 124.44 139.21 148.84 155.73
0.50 0.42 F (b∗1) 0.44 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.64
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 272.46 265.45 255.95 249.72 245.29
b∗1 102.90 114.26 129.79 140.14 147.65
1.00 0.84 F (b∗1) 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.61
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 265.24 256.11 243.34 234.71 228.42
b∗1 88.03 99.19 115.20 126.32 134.61
2.00 1.68 F (b∗1) 0.32 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.55
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 255.01 242.21 223.44 210.13 200.11
b∗1 77.96 88.52 104.31 115.68 124.35
3.00 2.52 F (b∗1) 0.27 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.50
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 248.12 232.41 208.42 190.78 177.16
b∗1 70.71 80.57 95.83 107.16 115.97
4.00 3.36 F (b∗1) 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.42 0.46
Ψ1(b
∗
1) 243.19 225.12 196.68 175.13 158.13
because he has maximum expected wealth and thus tends to bid higher than Alex.
Now, using (5.11) and Monte Carlo simulations, she can derive her expected op-
timal bid E(b∗1), her probability of winning, F [E(b∗1)] at that expected optimal bid
and her expected utility, Ψ1[E(b∗1)] for various assumed values of her winning and
losing regret parameters. We assume w1 = $250 and perform N = 500 simulations
and summarise these results in Table 5.3.
5.4 Level-k Thinking
A level-k analysis is the modelling of how deeply the opponent of a decision maker
(Brenda) thinks about the problem (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). Thus, a level-k
analysis for an n-player FPSB auction is when Brenda, a level-k thinker believes
143
Table 5.3: Brenda’s expected optimal bids, her probabilities of winning and expected util-
ities.
θ1 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
η1 E(η̂1) E(θ̂1) 0.69 1.38 2.76 4.14 5.52
E(b∗1) 113.07 124.09 138.75 148.32 155.18
0.50 0.38 F [E(b∗1)] 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.64
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 272.23 265.16 255.56 249.28 244.80
E(b∗1) 102.56 113.82 129.20 139.47 146.95
1.00 0.75 F [E(b∗1)] 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.61
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 264.90 255.65 242.71 233.95 227.58
E(b∗1) 87.74 98.77 114.58 125.57 133.78
2.00 1.50 F [E(b∗1)] 0.32 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.55
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 254.56 241.59 222.50 208.96 198.76
E(b∗1) 77.76 88.21 103.76 114.96 123.52
3.00 2.26 F [E(b∗1)] 0.27 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.50
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 247.65 231.71 207.33 189.37 175.48
E(b∗1) 70.59 80.36 95.38 106.52 115.19
4.00 3.01 F [E(b∗1)] 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.46
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 242.71 224.39 195.50 173.57 156.24
that the other (n − 1) bidders are level-(k-1) thinkers and each of them believes
that the other (n− 1) bidders are level-(k-2) thinkers, and so on.
Non-strategic play which we have discussed in Section 5.3 is basically a level-1
analysis where Brenda believes herself to be a level-1 thinker and models the other
(n− 1) bidders as level-0 (non-strategic) thinkers.
Here, we derive ARA solutions for Brenda for the case where k = 2. In a
level-2 analysis, Brenda models herself as a level-2 thinker and believes that the
other (n − 1) bidders are level-1 thinkers with each of them modelling the other
(n− 1) bidders as level-0 thinkers. Here, again we assume that Brenda is the 1st
bidder among the n bidders and believes that G1il and H1il are the distributions
of the lth bidder’s true value and wealth that the ith bidder might elicit with
supports [vil, v̄il] and [wil, w̄il], i = 2, . . . , n, l = 1, . . . , n, i 6= l, respectively, such
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that τ < vil ≤ wil and v̄il ≤ w̄il. Also, Brenda believes that F1il with supports
[bil, b̄il] is the distribution of the lth bidder’s bid that the ith bidder might elicit
such that τ < bil ≤ vil and b̄il ≤ v̄il. Brenda believes that the ith bidder will find
F1il using (5.8) as




where, g1il(vil) is the probability density function for the lth bidder’s true value
that the ith bidder might elicit that Brenda believes and t1il(pil) is Brenda’s belief
about the probability density function for the fraction of the lth bidder’s true value
this bidder will bid that the ith bidder might elicit.
Now, suppose that w1i, v1i, η1i and θ1i are the wealth, true value, winning regret
parameter and losing regret parameter, respectively, of the ith (level-1) bidder that
Brenda believes. Also, let w1ij be the wealth of the wealthiest bidder bidding bij.
This is assumed by Brenda to be the maximum bid among the other (n−1) bidders
that the ith (level-1) bidder might believe. (We remark that the value of j will
depend on the value of i, but for simplicity of notation, we do not formally show
this dependency.) So, Brenda believes that the ith (level-1) bidder would find
his optimal bid against the wealthiest among the other (n − 1) bidders for given
w1i, w1ij, v1i, η1i and θ1i as
B∗1i(w1i, w1ij, v1i, η1i, θ1i) = arg max
b1i>τ








i = 2, . . . , n, j 6= i,
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where W1i and V1i are the ith bidder’s wealth and true value, respectively, that
Brenda believes. Also, F1ij is the probability distribution on bij that the ith bid-
der can find against the jth bidder using (5.12) that Brenda believes. In practice,
Brenda is uncertain about η1i and θ1i and could elicit distributions on these pa-
rameters. The distributions on η1i and θ1i along with the distributions on w1i and
w1ij would allow her to derive the distributions for η̂1i and θ̂1i, respectively. We
denote the distributions on η̂1i and θ̂1i by Q1i and S1i, respectively. Then, she
can find the ith bidder’s expected optimal bid that she believe the ith bidder will
derive against the wealthiest among other (n− 1) bidders as
E(B∗1i) =
∫ ∫ ∫
B∗1i(w1i, w1ij, v1i, η1i, θ1i) dG1ij(vij) dQ1i(η̂1i) dS1i(θ̂1i),
i = 2, . . . , n, i 6= j,
(5.13)
where G1ij is the distribution on the jth bidder’s true value that the ith bidder
might elicit that Brenda believes. Now, using (5.13), Brenda will find j such that
bj = max{E(B∗1i), i = 2, . . . , n}. This bidder is the one that Brenda considers as
her competitor bidder. Then, she will find F1j, the distribution of her bid using
the change of variable formula as




where q1 = bj/vj, vj is the expected true value of the bidder bidding bj and g1j
is the probability distribution of the true value of the bidder bidding bj. Finally,
after having F1j, Brenda would find her optimal bid for a given value of wj, the
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wealth of the bidder bidding bj as
b∗1(wj) = arg max
b1>τ







θ̂1(bj − b1)f1j(bj)dbj], (5.14)
where η̂1 and θ̂1 are Brenda’s modified winning and losing regret parameters, re-
spectively. Brenda can use (5.14) to find her optimal bid by taking into account
her uncertainty around wj and can find her expected optimal bid using (5.11).
Example 5.2 Suppose Brenda is a level-2 thinker and believes that her opponents
Alex and Charles are level-1 thinkers. Brenda believes that Alex thinks that Charles
and Brenda are level-0 thinkers. Similarly, Brenda believes that Charles thinks that
Alex and Brenda are level-0 thinkers. Let Brenda, Alex and Charles be the first,
second and third bidders, respectively. Let Brenda’s true value for the item be
v1 = $200, she has her wealth w1 = $250 and the auctioned item has a reserve
price τ = $25. Then Brenda believes that:
• Alex has a uniform distribution on Brenda’s true value with v21 = $30 and
v̄21 = $200, i.e., G121 = (v21−30)200−30 .
• Alex has a uniform distribution on Brenda’s wealth with w21 = $100 and
w̄21 = $250, i.e., H121 = (w21−100)250−100 .
• Alex has a uniform distribution on Charles’s true value with v23 = $30 and
v̄23 = $250, i.e., G123 = (v23−30)250−30 .
• Alex has a uniform distribution on Charles’s wealth with w23 = $150 and
w̄23 = $300, i.e., H123 = (w23−150)300−150 .
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• Charles has a uniform distribution on Brenda’s true value with v31 = $30
and v̄31 = $230, i.e., G131 = (v31−30)230−30 .
• Charles has a uniform distribution on Brenda’s wealth with w31 = $125 and
w̄31 = $275, i.e., H131 = (w31−125)275−125 .
• Charles has a uniform distribution on Alex’s true value with v32 = $50 and
v̄32 = $220, i.e., G132 = (v32−50)220−50 .
• Charles has a uniform distribution on Alex’s wealth with w32 = $150 and
w̄32 = $350, i.e., H132 = (w32−150)350−150 .








• Charles’s valuation distribution is uniform with v3 = $50 and v̄3 = $300,
i.e., G13 = (v3−50)300−50 .




• Alex’s winning regret is distributed as Gamma with shape parameter 1 and
scale parameter 2 and his losing regret is also distributed as Gamma with
shape parameter 3 and scale parameter 1.
• Charles’s winning regret is distributed as Gamma with shape parameter 1.5
and scale parameter 1 and his losing regret is also distributed as Gamma with
shape parameter 3 and scale parameter 1.5.
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• Alex and Charles elicit their uncertainties around the fraction of their op-





(vil/vil < pil ≤ 1] for i = 2, 3 and l = 1, 2, 3, i 6= l.
Brenda believes that each of her opponents will use the expected value of their op-
ponents’ wealth as an estimate to find the wealthiest among their opponents. Thus,
Brenda believes that Alex being a level-1 thinker will find his wealthiest opponent
as max{E(W21),E(W23)} = max{175, 225} = 225 = E(W23), i.e., he would believe
Charles as his competitor bidder and will find his optimal bid E(B∗12) against him.
Also, Brenda believes that Charles being a level-1 thinker will find his wealthiest
opponent as max{E(W31),E(W32)} = max{200, 250} = 250 = E(W32), i.e., he
would believe Alex as his competitor bidder and will find his optimal bid E(B∗13)
against him. Using (5.8), (5.13) and from Monte Carlo simulations (N = 500),
she will find Alex’s expected optimal bid E(B∗12) = 98.58 against Charles by taking
into account Alex’s winning and losing regret. Also, from Monte Carlo simula-
tions, she will find Charles’s expected optimal bid E(B∗13) = 115.04 against Alex.
Then, she will find j such that bj = max{E(B∗12),E(B∗13)} = max{98.58, 115.04} =
115.04 = E(B∗13). So j = 3 and hence Charles’s (3rd bidder) is her competitor







b1 − q1 × v3
q1 × (v̄3 − v3)
=
b1 − q1 × 50






Now, using (5.11) and Monte Carlo simulations, she can derive her expected op-
timal bid E(b∗1), her probability of winning F [E(b∗1)] for that expected optimal bid
and her expected utility Ψ1[E(b∗1)] for that expected optimal bid for various levels of
her regret parameters. These are summarized in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Brenda’s (level-2 thinker) expected optimal bids, her probabilities of winning
and expected utilities.
θ1 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
η1 E(η̂1) E(θ̂1) 0.59 1.18 2.36 3.55 4.73
E(b∗1) 120.70 133.50 149.63 159.42 166.02
0.50 0.44 F [E(b∗1)] 0.53 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.81
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 270.86 261.41 249.50 242.29 237.46
E(b∗1) 109.78 122.77 139.92 150.79 158.30
1.00 0.87 F [E(b∗1)] 0.47 0.55 0.65 0.72 0.76
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 261.93 249.41 232.84 222.38 215.18
E(b∗1) 94.54 107.09 124.80 136.74 145.39
2.00 1.74 F [E(b∗1)] 0.38 0.45 0.56 0.63 0.68
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 249.44 231.75 206.66 189.70 177.48
E(b∗1) 84.40 96.15 113.51 125.79 134.97
3.00 2.61 F [E(b∗1)] 0.31 0.38 0.49 0.56 0.62
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 241.13 219.40 187.00 163.99 146.80
E(b∗1) 77.15 88.05 104.74 116.99 126.39
4.00 3.48 F [E(b∗1)] 0.27 0.34 0.44 0.51 0.57
Ψ1[E(b
∗
1)] 235.20 210.27 171.70 143.23 121.35
Now, we provide a brief sketch on how to find the ARA solution when Brenda
wants to perform a level-3 analysis. In this case, Brenda models herself as a level-
3 thinker and believes that her (n−1) opponents are level-2 thinkers. Each of these
level-2 thinkers would model their (n−1) opponents as level-1 thinkers and each of
these level-1 thinkers would model their (n− 1) rivals as level-0 thinkers. To find
the ARA solution in this case, Brenda would perform the level-2 analysis detailed
above for each of the other (n−1) bidders and will obtain their optimal bids using
(5.14) where b∗1(wi), b1, w1, v1, F1j, η̂1, and θ̂1, bj are replaced by B∗1i(wij), b1i, W1i,
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V1i, F1ij, η̂1i, and θ̂1i and bij respectively and wij be wealth of the level-1 thinker
bidder bidding maximum among other (n− 1) bidders that the ith bidder believes
for i = 2, . . . , n, i 6= j. Then, she will find bj, the maximum bid among other
(n−1) bidders using (5.14) (with the replaced quantities) and would get her belief
about F1j, the distribution of the jth bidder’s (level-2 thinker) bid. Then, she
can obtain her optimal bid b∗1(wj) or the expected optimal bid E(b∗1) using similar
process as in (5.10) and (5.11), respectively.
Using a level-k analysis, the key question is how large should the k be? Players
could choose a higher k while playing games such as Chess or Go, which are highly
structured games. However, Ho et al. (1998) and Lee and Wolpert (2012) based
on experimental evidences stated that, people typically do not think higher than
level 2 or 3. Therefore, it makes sense to solve the level-k problem for k being 1,
2 or 3 for FPSB auctions.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this Chapter, we assume that a single (normal) item is being auctioned in a
FPSB auction that has a reserve price which is typically known to each bidder
in advance. We define new regret parameters to take into account the effect of
bidder’s wealth on their bidding behavior and modify the utility function as used
by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) that incorporates bidders’ winning and
losing regret. We find ARA solutions not only using non-strategic play but also us-
ing the level-k thinking solution concept assuming n bidders participating in these
auctions. For this type of utility function, we take into account the uncertainties in
bidders’ winning and losing regret in addition to their valuations and wealth. We
151
model how an increase in the decision maker’s wealth will affect their winning and
losing regrets. We also provide numerical examples in which we use Monte Carlo
methods to illustrate our methodology to find ARA solutions for each solution
concept. Finding ARA solutions for a utility function that considers winning and
losing regret while taking into account the uncertainties regarding bidders’ valu-
ations, wealth and their regrets was methodologically and computationally more
challenging than that for a CRRA utility function. ARA solutions for the other
solution concepts such as ME and BNE for the utility function that we developed
in this Chapter are yet to be found.
Without loss of generality, we have made an assumption that the bidder with the
maximum wealth among other (n− 1) bidders could also have more valuation for
the auctioned item (because the item is normal) and therefore would bid maxi-
mum among other (n−1) bidders. Therefore, the decision maker will consider the
bidder with the maximum wealth among the other (n − 1) bidders as her main
competitor and will find her optimal bid against him. But, in practice, it could be
possible that a bidder with relatively low wealth could have a higher value for the
auctioned item and therefore could bid higher than the bidder having relatively
higher wealth but low valuation. Thus, it is important to model the maximum bid
among other (n− 1) bidders in a more general way that considers both the wealth
and valuation of the bidders.
We have assumed that the decision maker believes that each of her rivals are of the
same type, i.e., either non-strategic players or level-k thinkers. However, it might
be possible that the decision maker is uncertain about her rivals’ solution concepts.
This is called concept (model) uncertainty. In this case, she needs to take into ac-
count her concept uncertainty in order to find her optimal decision. Under concept
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uncertainty, first she needs to find her optimal decision E(b∗|M) conditional on
the given solution concept M (for example, non-strategic play, level-k thinking,
BNE and ME etc.). Second, she needs to elicit her subjective distribution Pr(M)
that reflects her uncertainty on M. Then, she can find her optimal decision by





One of the main challenges in implementing an ARA solution is the elicitation
of prior distributions. The elicitation of prior distributions is considered to be a
practical challenge while adopting almost any Bayesian approach, however, this
challenge is further accentuated in ARA where the decision maker not only needs
to elicit their own uncertainties, but also, the uncertainties of their adversaries.
Analysis of the robustness of the ARA solution to the choice of the prior distri-
butions is therefore necessary. Ríos Insua et al. (2016) provide an outline for a
robustness analysis using an ARA framework. However, mathematical framework
for implementing a prior robustness analysis for an ARA model has not yet been
developed. This is an important direction for further work.
Finally, many other types of auctions have been studied and used in practice.
These include other variations on the sealed bid auction process, such as the second-
price (Vickrey, 1961), the third-price (Kagel and Levin, 1993), or in general, the
mth−price (Cason, 1995; Shogren et al., 2001) sealed bid auctions have been pro-
posed. Shogren et al. (2001) showed that a random mth−price sealed-bid auction3
can induce sincere bidding in theory and practice than a second-price sealed-bid
3In a random mth−price sealed-bid auction, each bid is rank-ordered from highest to lowest;
the auctioneer selects a random number, the m in the mth−price sealed-bid auction, uniformly-
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auction when bidders’ values are far below or above the market-clearing price4 of
the auctioned items. ARA solutions for these variants on the sealed bid auctions
process need to be developed.
Finally, ARA methodology can further be applied to the auctions of a sequen-
tial paradigm where the decision maker and her opponents’ decisions alternatively
evolve over time such as in English5 or Dutch6 auctions etc. In such auctions,
there could be short or long term interactions among the bidders over time. An
approach developed by González-Ortega et al. (2019) could be used for short term
interactions with changing dynamics while a Markov decision process could be
used for long term interactions, with a fixed structure as argued by Joshi et al.
(2020). Thus, developing ARA solutions to sequential auctions is a challenging
research problem too.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion, Limitations and Further
Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we use adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology and provide
a more realistic approach to model bidders’ behaviours in first-price sealed-bid
(FPSB) auctions than what has previously been done. Specifically, we assume
that a single item is being auctioned and that it is a normal item which has a
reserve price that is typically known to each bidder in advance.
First, we assume two bidders in FPSB auctions and propose a new utility
function that takes into account bidders’ wealth which is an important determinant
of their bidding behaviour in these auctions. The new utility function is realistic
in a sense that it constrains the bidders’ bids and their true values in consideration
with their wealth. For our new proposed utility function, we define a new CRRA
parameter that models the change in bidders’ risk behaviour with the relative
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change in their wealth, as could be expected in case of a normal item. Then, we
extend the ARA solutions developed by Banks et al. (2015) using non-strategic
play and level-k thinking solution concepts, wherein we consider that the auctioned
item has reserve price, we assume not only risk-neutral bidders but also, risk-averse
and risk-seeking bidders and we assume each bidder has different wealth. We give
numerical examples to illustrate our methodology for each solution concept. A
Monte Carlo approach has been used to find the solutions in the given examples.
The examples show that when the bidders are assumed to be risk-averse, they bid
more aggressively than that when they are assumed to be risk-neutral. Whereas,
the risk-seeking bidders bid lower than that of risk-neutral bidders as expected.
Second, we find ARA solutions using mirror equilibrium (ME) and Bayes Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) solution concepts by taking into account the uncertainties
around bidders’ risk behaviour (risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking) and their
wealth that is assumed to be different for each bidder. For the symmetric case of
BNE solution concept, we assume n bidders and provide a general framework to
find ARA solutions. Whereas, for two bidders using the asymmetric case of BNE
solution concept, we show that ARA solutions turn out to be the same as that
of ARA solutions derived using ME solution concept. To illustrate our methodol-
ogy for each solution concept, we provide numerical examples. The uncertainties
around bidders’ wealth and their heterogeneous risk behaviour have been incorpo-
rated using a Monte Carlo approach for the ME and BNE solution concepts. The
bidders’ bidding behaviour has been illustrated by approximate equilibrium bid
functions along with 95% probability intervals. The results show that the bidders
become more risk-averse (less risk-seeking) with an increase in their wealth and
thus bid higher as expected.
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Third, we find ARA solutions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking
solution concepts assuming n bidders participating in FPSB auctions for another
type of utility function that incorporate bidders’ winning and losing regret. We
consider this type of utility function because CRRA utility function only explains
bidders’ observed behaviour and does not explain the inherent reasons why bid-
ders bid more than risk-neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) bid in FPSB auctions.
Among other reasons, one of the reasons explained in the economic literature of
this overbidding is that the bidders could have more losing regret than their win-
ning regret, therefore they bid more aggressively than RNNE bid. We propose
a new utility function by improving the utility function defined by Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2007). We consider that bidders have different wealth that
has not been considered yet for such type of utility function. In order to take into
account the effect of bidders’ wealth on their bidding behaviour, we define new
regret parameters. We take into account the uncertainties on bidders’ winning
and losing regret in addition to their valuations and wealth. We provide numerical
examples in which we use Monte Carlo method to show how bidders’ wealth affect
their bidding behaviours. Finding ARA solutions while taking into account the
uncertainties such as bidders’ valuation, wealth and their regrets by Monte Carlo
methods were methodologically and computationally more challenging than that
for the utility function with CRRA profit.
6.2 Limitations
Using an ARA approach, the decision maker’s optimal decision depends upon
the elicitation of her prior distributions to model her rivals actions for a certain
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solution concept. She places those prior distributions according to her belief based
upon her past experience against her adversaries or some information from her
informant etc. However, in practice, it might possible that she either does not
have any experience with some of her adversaries (n > 2) or she could not get any
information about those adversaries from any other source. In that case, there is a
chance of misspecification of prior distributions and that could result the decision
maker making a losing bid or a winning bid that is far from the second highest
bid.
Also, in this thesis, we have assumed that the decision maker believes that each
of her rivals use a certain solution concept (non-strategic play, level-k thinking, ME
or BNE) and models her actions using that solution concept. However, it might
be possible that the decision maker is uncertain about which solution concept her
rivals are going to be used. This type of uncertainty is called concept (model)
uncertainty and needs to be modelled as well.
For two bidders, our model is realistic. However, assuming n bidders, we have
made an assumption without loss of generality that the bidder with the maximum
wealth among other (n−1) bidders could also have more valuation for the auctioned
item (because the item is normal) and therefore would bid the maximum amount
among the other (n− 1) bidders. As a result, the decision maker will consider the
bidder with the maximum wealth among other (n− 1) bidders as her competitor
and find her optimal bid against him. But, in practice, it could be possible that
a bidder with relatively low wealth could relatively have a high value for the




As mentioned in Section 6.2, a critical issue while adopting an ARA approach
is the prior elicitation. Therefore, a robustness analysis of ARA solutions to the
choice of prior distributions is necessary to be carried out. Ríos Insua et al. (2016)
provided an outline how a robustness analysis using an ARA approach can be
performed. However, a mathematical framework for a prior robustness analysis
using an ARA approach has not been developed yet. It could be an important
area for further work.
Also, it is important for the decision maker to take into account her concept
(model) uncertainty. In order to do this, first she needs to find her expected
optimal decision conditional on the given solution concept M i.e., she needs to
find E(b∗|M). Second, she needs to elicit her subjective distribution Pr(M) that






Finding the decision maker’s optimal bid in case of n bidders, we have assumed
that she believes that the bidder with the maximum wealth among the other (n−1)
bidders could also have more valuation for the auctioned item. Therefore, this
bidder would make the maximum bid among the other (n−1) bidders. This could
be unrealistic in practice. Thus, it is important to find a realistic way to model the
maximum bid among other (n− 1) bidders while taking into account their wealth
and valuations.
Also, using the CRRA utility function and the risk-neutral utility function with
bidders’ regret that we have used in this thesis, the ARA solutions for other type
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of auctions such as general mth−price sealed-bid auctions (second-price sealed-bid
auctions for m = 2 by Vickrey (1961), third-price sealed-bid auction for m = 3
studied by Kagel and Levin (1993)) and a random mth−price sealed-bid auctions
studied by Cason (1995); Shogren et al. (2001) could be interesting to find.
Moreover, ARA solutions can further be found for the other type of auctions
such as in English, Dutch or sequential auctions etc., where the decision maker and
her rivals’ decisions alternatively evolve over time. In such auctions, there could
develop short or long term interactions among the bidders over time. González-
Ortega et al. (2019) developed an approach which could be applied to cater for
short term interactions with changing dynamics while a Markov decision process
(MDP) with a fixed structure could be used for long term interactions as suggested
by Joshi et al. (2020).
Further, ARA solutions using ME and BNE solution concepts for the utility
function that considers bidders’ regret are yet to be found and could be challenging.
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